On the basis of Article 6 of the APPI and that Cabinet Decision, the PPC on 15 June 2018 adopted "Supplementary Rules under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information for the Handling of Personal Data Transferred from the EU based on an Adequacy Decision" (the "Supplementary Rules") with a view to enhance the protection of personal information transferred from the European Union to Japan based on the present adequacy decision. Those Supplementary Rules are legally binding on Japanese business operators and enforceable, both by the PPC and by courts, in the same way as the provisions of the APPI that the Rules supplement with stricter and/or more detailed rules (12). As Japanese business operators receiving and/or further processing personal data from the European Union will be under a legal obligation to comply with the Supplementary Rules, they will need to ensure (e.g. by technical ("tagging") or organisational means (storing in a dedicated database)) that they can identify such personal data throughout their "life cycle" (13). In the following sections, the content of each Supplementary Rule is analysed as part of the assessment of the articles of the APPI it complements.

Requirements applicable to anonymously processed personal information, as defined in Article 2(9) of the APPI, are stipulated in Section 2 of Chapter 4 of the Act ("Duties of an Anonymously Processed Information Handling Business Operator"). Conversely, such information is not governed by the provisions of Section 1 of Chapter IV of the APPI which includes the articles stipulating the data protection safeguards and rights applying to the processing of personal data under that Act. Consequently, while "anonymously processed personal information" is not subject to the "standard" data protection rules (those specified in Section 1 of Chapter IV and in Article 42 of the APPI), they do fall within the scope of application of the APPI, notably Articles 36 to 39.

"Special care-required personal information" is defined in Article 2(3) of the APPI. That provision refers to "personal information comprising a principal's race, creed, social status, medical history, criminal record, fact of having suffered damage by a crime, or other descriptions etc. prescribed by Cabinet Order as those of which the handling requires special care so as not to cause unfair discrimination, prejudice or other disadvantages to the principal". These categories correspond for a large part to the list of sensitive data under Articles 9 and 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. In particular, "medical history" corresponds to health data, while "criminal record and the fact of having suffered damage by a crime" are substantially the same as the categories referred to in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The categories referred to in Article 2(3) of the APPI are subject to further interpretation in the Cabinet Order and PPC Guidelines. According to section 2.3 point (8) of the PPC Guidelines, the sub-categories of "medical history" detailed in Article 2(ii) and (iii) of the Cabinet Order are interpreted as covering genetic and biometric data. Also, while the list does not expressly include the terms "ethnic origin" and "political opinion", it does include references to "race" and "creed". As explained in section 2.3 points (1) and (2) of the PPC Guidelines, reference to "race" covers "ethnic ties or ties to a certain part of the world", while "creed" is understood as including both religious and political views.

Finally, the APPI creates a framework for the participation of sectoral industry organisations in ensuring a high level of compliance (see Chapter IV, Section 4). The role of such accredited personal information protection organisations (40) is to promote the protection of personal information by supporting businesses through their expertise, but also to contribute to the implementation of safeguards, notably by handling individual complaints and helping to solve related conflicts. To that end, they may request participating PIHBOs, if appropriate, to adopt necessary measures (41). Moreover, in case of data breaches or other security incidents PHIBOs shall in principle inform the PPC as well as the data subject (or the public) and take necessary action, including measures to minimise any damage and to prevent any recurrence of similar incidents (42). While those are voluntary schemes, on 10 August 2017 the PPC had listed 44 organisations, with the largest one, Japan Information Processing and Development Center (JIPDEC), alone counting 15 436 participating business operators (43). Accredited schemes include sector associations such as for instance the Japan Securities Dealers Association, the Japan Association of Car Driving Schools or the Association of Marriage Brokers (44).

Although not all provisions of Chapter IV, Section 1 of the APPI are listed in Article 42(1) – which also determines the scope of application of Article 42(2) – this can be explained by the fact that certain of those provisions do not concern obligations of the PIHBO (59) and that all essential protections are already afforded by other provisions that are included in that list. For instance, although Article 15 (requiring the PIHBO to set the utilisation purpose and process the relevant personal information exclusively within its scope) is not mentioned, failure to observe this requirement can give ground to a recommendation based on a violation of Article 16(1) (prohibiting the PIHBO to process personal information beyond what is necessary to achieve the utilisation purpose, unless it obtains the data subject's consent) (60). Another provision not listed in Article 42(1) is Article 19 of the APPI on data accuracy and retention. Non-compliance with that provision can be enforced either as a violation of Article 16(1) or based on a violation of Article 29(2), if the individual concerned asks for the correction or deletion of erroneous or excessive data and the PIHBO refuses to satisfy the request. As regards the rights of the data subject according to Articles 28(1), 29(1) and 30(1), oversight by the PPC is ensured by granting it enforcement powers with respect to the corresponding obligations of the PIHBO laid down in those Articles.

As regards specifically the right to data protection, Chapter III, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the APPI lays down general principles covering all sectors, including the public sector. In particular, Article 3 of the APPI provides that all personal information must be handled in accordance with the principle of respect for the personality of individuals. Once personal information, including as part of electronic records, has been collected ("obtained") by public authorities (78), its handling is governed by the Act on the Protection of Personal Information held by Administrative Organs ("APPIHAO") (79). This includes in principle (80) also the processing of personal information for criminal law enforcement or national security purposes. Among others, the APPIHAO provides that public authorities: (i) may only retain personal information to the extent this is necessary for carrying out their duties; (ii) shall not use such information for an "unjust" purpose or disclose it to a third person without justification; (iii) shall specify the purpose and not change that purpose beyond what can reasonably be considered as relevant for the original purpose (purpose limitation); (iv) shall in principle not use or provide a third person with the retained personal information for other purposes and, if they consider this necessary, impose restrictions on the purpose or method of use by third parties; (v) shall endeavour to ensure the correctness of the information (data quality); (vi) shall take the necessary measures for the proper management of the information and to prevent leakage, loss or damage (data security); and (vii) shall endeavour to properly and expeditiously process any complaints regarding the processing of the information (81).

These oversight mechanisms, which are further strengthened through the possibility for individuals to trigger the intervention of the PPC as an independent supervisory authority (see below section 168), provide adequate guarantees against the risk of abuse by Japanese authorities of their powers in the area of national security, and against any unlawful collection of electronic information.