(24)
As regards the first of those two categories, it is explained in Article 4 of the Cabinet Order and covers four types of exemptions (20). These exemptions pursue similar objectives as those listed in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, notably protection of the data subject ("principal" in the terminology of the APPI) and the freedom of others, national security, public security, criminal law enforcement or other important objectives of general public interest. In addition, it results from the wording of Article 4(1)(i)-(iv) of the Cabinet Order that their application always presupposes a specific risk for one of the protected important interests (21).
(64)
Both the requirements of Article 18 and the obligation to inform about the utilisation purpose under Article 27 of the APPI are subject to the same set of exceptions, mostly based on public interest considerations and the protection of rights and interests of the data subject, third parties and the controller (37). According to the interpretation developed in the PPC Guidelines, those exceptions apply in very specific situations, such as where information on the utilisation purpose would risk undermining legitimate measures taken by the business operator to protect certain interests (e.g. fight against fraud, industrial espionage, sabotage).
(84)
These rights are subject to three types of restrictions, relating to the individual's own or third parties’ rights and interests (51), serious interference with the PIHBO's business operations (52) as well as cases in which disclosure would violate other laws or regulations (53). The situations in which these restrictions would apply are similar to some of the exceptions applicable under Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which allows for restrictions of the rights of individuals for reasons related to the "protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others" or "other important objectives of general public interest". Although the category of cases in which disclosure would violate "other laws or regulations" may appear broad, laws and regulations providing for limitations in this regard must respect the constitutional right to privacy and may impose restrictions only to the extent that the exercise of this right would "interfere with the public welfare" (54). This requires a balancing of the interests at stake.
(116)
Importantly, Article 21(2) of the Constitution guarantees the secrecy of all means of communication, with limitations only allowed by legislation on public interest grounds. Article 4 of the Telecommunications Business Act, according to which the secrecy of communications handled by a telecommunications carrier shall not be violated, implements this confidentiality requirement at the level of statutory law. This has been interpreted as prohibiting the disclosure of communications information, except with the consent of users or if based on one of the explicit exemptions from criminal liability under the Penal Code (77).
(113)
The Commission has also assessed the limitations and safeguards, including the oversight and individual redress mechanisms available in Japanese law as regards the collection and subsequent use of personal data transferred to business operators in Japan by public authorities for public interest, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes ("government access"). In this respect, the Japanese government has provided the Commission with official representations, assurances and commitments signed at the highest ministerial and agency level that are contained in Annex II to this Decision.
(173)
Finally, on the basis of the available information about the Japanese legal order, including the representations, assurances and commitments from the Japanese government contained in Annex II, the Commission considers that any interference with the fundamental rights of the individuals whose personal data are transferred from the European Union to Japan by Japanese public authorities for public interest purposes, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes, will be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question, and that effective legal protection against such interference exists.