This exception is further specified in Article 3(1) of the Cabinet Order, according to which the three following cumulative conditions must be fulfilled: (i) the collective body of information must have been "issued for the purpose of being sold to a large number of unspecified persons and the issuance of which has not been conducted in violation of the provisions of a law or order based thereon"; (ii) must be capable of being "purchased at any time by a large number of unspecified persons" and (iii) the personal data contained therein must be "provided for their original purpose without adding other information relating to a living individual". According to the explanations received from the PPC, this narrow exception was introduced with the aim of excluding telephone books or similar types of directories.

As concerns the obligation to keep data accurate and up to date, Article 19 of the APPI requires the PIHBO to "strive to keep personal data accurate and up-to-date within the scope necessary to achieve a utilisation purpose". That provision should be read together with Article 16(1) of the APPI: according to the explanations received from the PPC, if a PIHBO fails to meet the prescribed standards of accuracy, the processing of the personal information will not be considered as achieving the utilisation purpose and hence, its handling will become unlawful under Article 16(1).

Accredited personal information protection organisations submit annual reports on their operations. According to the "Overview of the Implementation Status [of] the APPI in FY 2015" published by the PPC, accredited personal information protection organisations received a total of 442 complaints, required 123 explanations from business operators under their jurisdiction, requested documents from these operators in 41 cases, gave 181 instructions and made two recommendations (45).

Differently from EU law, the APPI and relevant sub-statutory rules do not contain general provisions addressing the issue of decisions affecting the data subject and based solely on the automated processing of personal data. However, the issue is addressed in certain sectoral rules applicable in Japan that are particularly relevant for this type of processing. This includes sectors in which companies most likely resort to the automated processing of personal data to take decisions affecting individuals (e.g. the financial sector). For example, the "Comprehensive Guidelines for Supervision over Major Banks", as revised in June 2017, require that the concerned individual be provided with specific explanations on the reasons for the rejection of a request to conclude a loan agreement. Those rules thus offer protections in the likely rather limited number of cases where automated decisions would be taken by the "importing" Japanese business operator itself (rather than the "exporting" EU data controller).

In addition, with respect to the correct application of the APPIHAO, the competent minister or agency head (e.g. the Commissioner General of the NPA) has enforcement authority, subject to the supervision by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC). According to Article 49 APPIHAO, the MIC "may collect reports on the status of enforcement of this Act" from the heads of Administrative Organs (Minister). That oversight function is supported by input from MIC's 51 "comprehensive information centres" (one in each Prefecture throughout Japan) that each year handle thousands of inquiries from individuals (114) (which, in turn, may reveal possible violations of the law). Where it considers this necessary for ensuring compliance with the Act, MIC may request the submission of explanations and materials, and issue opinions, concerning the handling of personal information by the concerned Administrative Organ (Articles 50, 51 APPIHAO).

As regards MOD, oversight is exercised by the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance (IGO) (134) that has been established based on Article 29 of the MOD Establishment Act as an office within the MOD under the supervision of the Minister of Defence (to which it reports) but independent from MOD's operational departments. The IGO has the task of ensuring compliance with laws and regulations as well as the proper execution of duties by MOD officials. Among its powers is the authority to carry out so-called "Defence Inspections", both at regular intervals ("Regular Defence Inspections") and in individual cases ("Special Defence Inspections"), which in the past have also covered the proper handling of personal information (135). In the context of such inspections, the IGO may enter sites (offices) and request the submission of documents or information, including explanations by the Deputy Vice-Minister of the MOD. The inspection is concluded through a report to the Minister of Defence setting out the findings and measures for improvement (the implementation of which can again be checked through further inspections). The report in turn forms the basis for instructions from the Minister of Defence to implement the measures necessary to address the situation; the Deputy Vice-Minister is charged with carrying out such measures and has to report on the follow-up.

As is the case for investigations in the area of criminal law enforcement, also in the area of national security individuals may obtain individual redress by directly contacting the PPC. This will trigger the specific dispute resolution procedure that the Japanese government has created for EU individuals whose personal data is transferred under this Decision (see detailed explanations in recitals 141 to 144, 149).

To perform the review, the Commission should meet with the PPC, accompanied, where appropriate, by other Japanese authorities responsible for government access, including relevant oversight bodies. The participation in this meeting should be open to representatives of the members of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). In the framework of the Joint Review, the Commission should request the PPC to provide comprehensive information on all aspects relevant for the adequacy finding, including on the limitations and safeguards concerning government access (152). The Commission should also seek explanations on any information relevant for this Decision that it has received, including public reports by Japanese authorities or other stakeholders in Japan, the EDPB, individual DPAs, civil society groups, media reports, or any other available source of information.