On the basis of Article 6 of the APPI and that Cabinet Decision, the PPC on 15 June 2018 adopted "Supplementary Rules under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information for the Handling of Personal Data Transferred from the EU based on an Adequacy Decision" (the "Supplementary Rules") with a view to enhance the protection of personal information transferred from the European Union to Japan based on the present adequacy decision. Those Supplementary Rules are legally binding on Japanese business operators and enforceable, both by the PPC and by courts, in the same way as the provisions of the APPI that the Rules supplement with stricter and/or more detailed rules (12). As Japanese business operators receiving and/or further processing personal data from the European Union will be under a legal obligation to comply with the Supplementary Rules, they will need to ensure (e.g. by technical ("tagging") or organisational means (storing in a dedicated database)) that they can identify such personal data throughout their "life cycle" (13). In the following sections, the content of each Supplementary Rule is analysed as part of the assessment of the articles of the APPI it complements.

Under the APPI, no specific distinction is drawn between the obligations imposed on controllers and processors. The absence of this distinction does not affect the level of protection because all PIHBOs are subject to all provisions of the Act. A PIHBO that entrusts the handling of personal data to a trustee (the equivalent of a processor under the GDPR) remains subject to the obligations under the APPI and Supplementary Rules with regard to the data it has entrusted. Additionally, under Article 22 of the APPI, it is bound to "exercise necessary and appropriate supervision" over the trustee. In turn, as the PPC has confirmed, the trustee is itself bound by all the obligations in the APPI and the Supplementary Rules.

Article 76 of the APPI excludes certain types of data processing from the application of Chapter IV of the Act, which contains the central data protection provisions (basic principles, obligations of business operators, individual rights, supervision by the PPC). Processing covered by the sectoral exclusion in Article 76 is also exempted from the enforcement powers of the PPC, pursuant to Article 43(2) of the APPI (24).

As concerns the obligation to keep data accurate and up to date, Article 19 of the APPI requires the PIHBO to "strive to keep personal data accurate and up-to-date within the scope necessary to achieve a utilisation purpose". That provision should be read together with Article 16(1) of the APPI: according to the explanations received from the PPC, if a PIHBO fails to meet the prescribed standards of accuracy, the processing of the personal information will not be considered as achieving the utilisation purpose and hence, its handling will become unlawful under Article 16(1).

Article 18(1) of the APPI requires the PIHBO to make information about the utilisation purpose of the personal information acquired available to the data subject, except for "cases where a utilisation purpose has been disclosed in advance to the public". The same obligation applies in case of a permissible change of purpose (Article 18(3)). This also ensures that the data subject is informed of the fact that his/her data has been collected. Although the APPI does not generally require the PIHBO to inform the data subject about the expected recipients of personal information at the stage of collection, such information is a necessary condition for any subsequent disclosure of information to a third party (recipient) based on Article 23(2), hence where this is done without prior consent of the data subject.

Both the requirements of Article 18 and the obligation to inform about the utilisation purpose under Article 27 of the APPI are subject to the same set of exceptions, mostly based on public interest considerations and the protection of rights and interests of the data subject, third parties and the controller (37). According to the interpretation developed in the PPC Guidelines, those exceptions apply in very specific situations, such as where information on the utilisation purpose would risk undermining legitimate measures taken by the business operator to protect certain interests (e.g. fight against fraud, industrial espionage, sabotage).

Under the accountability principle, entities processing data are required to put in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to effectively comply with their data protection obligations and be able to demonstrate such compliance, in particular to the competent supervisory authority.

Although not all provisions of Chapter IV, Section 1 of the APPI are listed in Article 42(1) – which also determines the scope of application of Article 42(2) – this can be explained by the fact that certain of those provisions do not concern obligations of the PIHBO (59) and that all essential protections are already afforded by other provisions that are included in that list. For instance, although Article 15 (requiring the PIHBO to set the utilisation purpose and process the relevant personal information exclusively within its scope) is not mentioned, failure to observe this requirement can give ground to a recommendation based on a violation of Article 16(1) (prohibiting the PIHBO to process personal information beyond what is necessary to achieve the utilisation purpose, unless it obtains the data subject's consent) (60). Another provision not listed in Article 42(1) is Article 19 of the APPI on data accuracy and retention. Non-compliance with that provision can be enforced either as a violation of Article 16(1) or based on a violation of Article 29(2), if the individual concerned asks for the correction or deletion of erroneous or excessive data and the PIHBO refuses to satisfy the request. As regards the rights of the data subject according to Articles 28(1), 29(1) and 30(1), oversight by the PPC is ensured by granting it enforcement powers with respect to the corresponding obligations of the PIHBO laid down in those Articles.

Second, in the case where an alleged infringement does not concern individual rights under Articles 28, 29 and 30 but general data protection principles or obligations of the PIHBO, the concerned individual may bring a civil action against the business operator based on the torts provisions of the Japanese Civil Code, especially Article 709. While a lawsuit under Article 709 requires, aside from fault (intention or negligence), a demonstration of harm, according to Article 710 of the Civil Code such harm may be both material and immaterial. No limitation is imposed as to the amount of compensation.

As regards the interception of communications, Article 3 of the Wiretapping Act authorises such measures only under strict requirements. In particular, the public authorities have to obtain a prior court warrant that may only be issued for the investigation of specific serious crimes (listed in the Annex to the Act) (85) and when it is "extremely difficult to identify the criminal or clarify the situations/details of the perpetration by any other ways" (86). Under Article 5 of the Wiretapping Act, the warrant is issued for a limited period of time and additional conditions may be imposed by the judge. Moreover, the Wiretapping Act provides for a number of further guarantees, such as for instance the necessary attendance of witnesses (Articles 12, 20), the prohibition to wiretap the communications of certain privileged groups (e.g. doctors, lawyers) (Article 15), the obligation to terminate the wiretapping if it is no longer justified, even within the period of validity of the warrant (Article 18), or the general requirement to notify the individual concerned and allow access to the records within thirty days after the wiretapping has been terminated (Articles 23, 24).

Aside from these limitations for the exercise of public authority, business operators themselves are expected to check ("confirm") the necessity and "rationality" of the provision to a third party (99). This includes the question whether they are prevented by law from cooperating. Such conflicting legal obligations may in particular follow from confidentiality obligations such as Article 134 of the Penal Code (concerning the relationship between a doctor, lawyer, priest, etc. and his/her client). Also, "any person engaged in the telecommunication business shall, while in office, maintain the secrets of others that have come to be known with respect to communications being handled by the telecommunication carrier" (Article 4(2) of the Telecommunication Business Act). This obligation is backed-up by the sanction stipulated in Article 179 of the Telecommunication Business Act, according to which any person that has violated the secrecy of communications being handled by a telecommunications carrier shall be guilty of a criminal offence and punished by imprisonment with labour of up to two years, or to a fine of not more than one million yen (100). While this requirement is not absolute and in particular allows for measures infringing the secrecy of communications that constitute "justifiable acts" within the meaning of Article 35 of the Penal Code (101), this exception does not cover the response to non-compulsory requests by public authorities for the disclosure of electronic information pursuant to Article 197(2) of the CCP.

Second, according to Article 62 of the Constitution, each House of the Japanese parliament (the Diet) may conduct investigations in relation to the government, including with respect to the lawfulness of information collection by the police. To that end, it may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and/or the production of records. Those powers of inquiry are further specified in the Diet Law, in particular Chapter XII. In particular, Article 104 of the Diet Law provides that the Cabinet, public agencies and other parts of the government "must comply with the requests of a House or any of its Committees for the production of reports and records necessary for consideration of investigation." Refusal to comply is allowed only if the government provides a plausible reason found acceptable by the Diet, or upon issuance of a formal declaration that the production of the reports or records would be "gravely detrimental to the national interest" (106). In addition, Diet members may ask written questions to the Cabinet (Articles 74, 75 of the Diet Law), and in the past such "written inquiries" have also addressed the handling of personal information by the administration (107). The Diet's role in supervising the executive is supported by reporting obligations, for instance pursuant to Article 29 of the Wiretapping Act.

First, with respect to personal information collected by Administrative Organs, the latter are under an obligation to "endeavour to properly and expeditiously process any complaints" regarding its subsequent processing (Article 48 of the APPIHAO). While Chapter IV of the APPIHAO on individual rights is not applicable with respect to personal information recorded in "documents relating to trials and seized articles" (Article 53-2(2) of the CCP) – which covers personal information collected as part of criminal investigations – individuals may bring a complaint to invoke the general data protection principles such as for instance the obligation to only retain personal information "when the retention is necessary for performing [law enforcement functions]" (Article 3(1) of the APPIHAO).

Second, given that redress will naturally have to be sought abroad in a foreign system and in a foreign language, in order to facilitate redress for EU individuals whose personal data is transferred to business operators in Japan and then accessed by public authorities, the Japanese government has made use of its powers to create a specific mechanism, administered and supervised by PPC, for handling and resolving complaints in this field. That mechanism builds on the cooperation obligation imposed on Japanese public authorities under the APPI and the special role of the PPC with respect to international data transfers from third countries under Article 6 of the APPI and the Basic Policy (as established by the Japanese government through Cabinet Order). The details of this mechanism are set out in the official representations, assurances and commitments received from the Japanese government and attached to this Decision as Annex II. The mechanism is not subject to any standing requirement and is open to any individual, independently of whether (s)he is suspected or accused of a criminal offence.

Under the mechanism, an individual who suspects that his/her data transferred from the European Union has been collected or used by public authorities in Japan (including those responsible for criminal law enforcement) in violation of the applicable rules can submit a complaint to the PPC (individually or though his/her data protection authority within the meaning of Article 51 of the GDPR). The PPC will be under an obligation to handle the complaint and in a first step inform the competent public authorities, including the relevant oversight bodies, thereof. Those authorities are required to cooperate with the PPC, "including by providing the necessary information and relevant material, so that the PPC can evaluate whether the collection or the subsequent use of personal information has taken place in compliance with the applicable rules" (117). This obligation, derived from Article 80 of the APPI (requiring Japanese public authorities to co-operate with PPC), applies in general and hence extends to the review of any investigatory measures taken by such authorities, which moreover have committed to such cooperation through written assurances from the competent ministries and agency heads, as reflected in Annex II.

If the evaluation shows that an infringment of the applicable rules has occurred, "cooperation by the concerned public authorities with the PPC includes the obligation to remedy the violation", which in case of the unlawful collection of personal information covers the deletion of such data. Importantly, this obligation is carried out under the supervision of the PPC which will "confirm, before concluding the evaluation, that the violation has been fully remedied".

According to the Japanese authorities, there is no law in Japan permitting compulsory requests for information or "administrative wiretapping" outside criminal investigations. Hence, on national security grounds information may only be obtained from an information source that can be freely accessed by anyone or by voluntary disclosure. Business operators receiving a request for voluntary cooperation (in the form of disclosure of electronic information) are under no legal obligation to provide such information (124).

First, the Japanese Diet through its specialised committees may examine the lawfulness of investigations based on its powers of parliamentary scrutiny (Article 62 of the Constitution, Article 104 of the Diet Law; see recital 134). This oversight function is supported by specific reporting obligations on the activities carried out under some of the aforementioned legal bases (133).

As regards individual redress, with respect to personal information collected and thus "retained" by Administrative Organs, the latter are under an obligation to "endeavour to properly and expeditiously process any complaints" regarding such processing (Article 48 APPIHAO).