2.2.1 - Definition of personal information2.2.2 - Definition of personal data2.2.3 - Definition of retained personal data2.2.4 - Definition of anonymously processed personal information2.2.5 - Definition of Personal Information Handling Business Operator (PIHBO)2.2.6 - Concepts of controller and processor2.2.7 - Sectoral exclusions
2.3.1 - Purpose limitation2.3.2. - Lawfulness and fairness of processing2.3.3. - Data accuracy and minimisation2.3.4. - Storage limitation2.3.5. - Data security2.3.6. - Transparency2.3.7. - Special categories of data2.3.8. - Accountability2.3.9. - Restrictions on onward transfers2.3.10. - Individual rights
3.1 - General legal framework3.2 - Access and use by Japanese public authorities for criminal law enforcement purposes3.2.1 - Legal basis and applicable limitations/safeguards3.2.1.1 - Compulsory investigation based on a court warrant3.2.1.2 - Request for voluntary disclosure based on an "enquiry sheet"3.2.1.3 - Further use of the information collected3.2.2 - Independent oversight3.2.3 - Individual redress3.3 - Access and use by Japanese public authorities for national security purposes3.3.1 - Legal basis and applicable limitations/safeguards
3.3.2 - Independent oversight
3.3.3 - Individual redress
(152)
Also, according to the information received only four government entities are empowered to collect electronic information held by Japanese business operators on national security grounds, namely: (i) the Cabinet Intelligence & Research Office (CIRO); (ii) the Ministry of Defence ("MOD"); (iii) the police (both National Police Agency (NPA) (125) and Prefectural Police); and (iv) the Public Security Intelligence Agency ("PSIA"). However, the CIRO never collects information directly from business operators, including by means of interception of communications. Where it receives information from other government authorities in order to provide analysis to the Cabinet, these other authorities in turn have to comply with the law, including the limitations and safeguards analysed in this Decision. Its activities are thus not relevant in a transfer context.
(155)
Finally, the PSIA may carry out investigations under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act ("SAPA") and the Act on the Control of Organisations Which Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder ("ACO") where such investigations are necessary to prepare the adoption of control measures against certain organisations (126). Under both Acts, upon request by the Director-General of the PSIA the Public Security Examination Commission may issue certain "dispositions" (surveillance/prohibitions in the case of the ACO (127), dissolution/prohibitions in the case of the SAPA (128) and in this context the PSIA may carry out investigations (129). According to the information received, these investigations are always conducted on a voluntary basis, meaning that the PSIA may not force an owner of personal information to provide such information (130). Each time, controls and investigations shall be conducted only to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the control purpose and shall not under any circumstances be carried out to "unreasonably" restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of Japan (Article 3(1) of SAPA/ACO). Moreover, according to Article 3(2) of the SAPA/ACO, the PSIA must under no circumstances abuse such controls, or the investigations carried out to prepare such controls. If a Public Security Intelligence Officer has abused his/her authority under the respective Act by forcing a person to do anything which the person is not required to, or by interfering with the exercise of a person's rights, (s)he may be subject to criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 45 SAPA or Article 42 ACO. Finally, both Acts explicitly prescribe that their provisions, including the powers granted therein, shall "not under any circumstances be subject to an expanded interpretation" (Article 2 of SAPA/ACO).