This exception is further specified in Article 3(1) of the Cabinet Order, according to which the three following cumulative conditions must be fulfilled: (i) the collective body of information must have been "issued for the purpose of being sold to a large number of unspecified persons and the issuance of which has not been conducted in violation of the provisions of a law or order based thereon"; (ii) must be capable of being "purchased at any time by a large number of unspecified persons" and (iii) the personal data contained therein must be "provided for their original purpose without adding other information relating to a living individual". According to the explanations received from the PPC, this narrow exception was introduced with the aim of excluding telephone books or similar types of directories.

According to the PPC Guidelines, "business" means any "conduct aimed at exercising, for a certain goal, regardless of whether or not for profit, repeatedly and continuously, a socially recognised enterprise". Organisations without legal personality (such as de facto associations) or individuals are considered as a PIHBO if they provide (use) a personal information database etc. for their business (23). Therefore, the notion of "business" under the APPI is very broad in that it includes not only for-profit but also not-for-profit activities by all kinds of organisations and individuals. Moreover, "use in business" also covers personal information that is not used in the operator's (external) commercial relationships, but internally, for instance the processing of employee data.

Second, pursuant to Article 29(1) and (2) of the APPI, a data subject has a right to request the correction, addition or deletion of his/her retained personal data in the case where the data is inaccurate. Upon receipt of such a request, the PIHBO "shall […] conduct a necessary investigation" and, based on the results of such an investigation, "make a correction etc. of the contents of the retained data".

More specifically, pursuant to Article 218(1) of the CCP, a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for the investigation of an offence, conduct a search or seizure (including ordering records) upon a warrant issued by a judge in advance (83). Among others, such a warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offence (84), the electromagnetic records to be seized and the "place or articles" to be inspected (Article 219(1) of the CCP).

For all compulsory measures based on a warrant, only such an examination "as is necessary to achieve its objective" – that is to say where the objectives pursued with the investigation cannot be achieved otherwise – may be conducted (Article 197(1) CCP). Although the criteria for determining necessity are not further specified in statutory law, the Supreme Court of Japan has ruled that the judge issuing a warrant should make an overall assessment taking into consideration in particular (i) the gravity of the offence and how it was committed; (ii) the value and importance of the materials to be seized as evidence; (iii) the probability (risk) that evidence may be concealed or destroyed; and (iv) the extent to which the seizure may cause prejudice to the individual concerned (87).

Second, according to Article 62 of the Constitution, each House of the Japanese parliament (the Diet) may conduct investigations in relation to the government, including with respect to the lawfulness of information collection by the police. To that end, it may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and/or the production of records. Those powers of inquiry are further specified in the Diet Law, in particular Chapter XII. In particular, Article 104 of the Diet Law provides that the Cabinet, public agencies and other parts of the government "must comply with the requests of a House or any of its Committees for the production of reports and records necessary for consideration of investigation." Refusal to comply is allowed only if the government provides a plausible reason found acceptable by the Diet, or upon issuance of a formal declaration that the production of the reports or records would be "gravely detrimental to the national interest" (106). In addition, Diet members may ask written questions to the Cabinet (Articles 74, 75 of the Diet Law), and in the past such "written inquiries" have also addressed the handling of personal information by the administration (107). The Diet's role in supervising the executive is supported by reporting obligations, for instance pursuant to Article 29 of the Wiretapping Act.

Third, also within the executive branch the Prefectural Police is subject to independent oversight. That includes in particular the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions established at prefectural level to ensure democratic administration and political neutrality of the police (108). These commissions are composed of members appointed by the Prefectural Governor with the consent of the Prefectural Assembly (from among citizens with no public servant position in the police in the five preceding years) and have a secure term of office (in particular only dismissal for good cause) (109). According to the information received, they are not subject to instructions, and thus can be considered as fully independent (110). As regards the tasks and powers of the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions, pursuant to Article 38(3) in conjunction with Articles 2 and 36(2) of the Police Law they are responsible for "the protection of [the] rights and freedom of an individual". To this effect, they are empowered to “supervise” (111) all investigatory activities of the Prefectural Police, including the collection of personal data. Notably, the commissions "may direct the [P]refectural [P]olice in detail or in a specific individual case of inspection of police personnel's misconduct, if necessary" (112). When the Chief of the Prefectural Police (113) receives such a direction or by him-/herself becomes aware of a possible case of misconduct (including the violation of laws or other neglect of duties), (s)he has to promptly inspect the case and report the inspection result to the Prefectural Public Safety Commission (Article 56(3) of the Police Law). Where the latter considers this necessary, it may also designate one of its members to review the status of implementation. The process continues until the Prefectural Public Safety Commission is satisfied that the incident has been appropriately addressed.

In addition, Article 79 of the Police Law guarantees individuals who have concerns with respect to the "execution of duties" by police personnel the right to lodge a complaint with the (competent) independent Prefectural Public Safety Commission. The Commission will "faithfully" handle such complaints in accordance with laws and local ordinances and shall notify the complainant in writing of the results. Based on its authority to supervise and "direct" the Prefectural Police with respect to "personnel's misconduct" (Articles 38(3), 43-2(1) of the Police Law), it may request the Prefectural Police to investigate the facts, take appropriate measures based on the outcome of this investigation and report on the results. If it considers that the investigation carried out by the Police has not been adequate, the Commission may also provide instructions on the handling of the complaint.

According to the information received, the MOD collects (electronic) information on the basis of the MOD Establishment Act. Pursuant to its Article 3, the mission of the MOD is to manage and operate the military forces and "to conduct such affairs as related thereto in order to secure national peace and independence, and the safety of the nation." Article 4(4) provides that the MOD shall have jurisdiction over the "defence and guard", over the actions to be taken by the Self-Defence Forces as well as over the deployment of the military forces, including the collection of information necessary to conduct those affairs. It only has authority to collect (electronic) information from business operators through voluntary cooperation.

Finally, the PSIA may carry out investigations under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act ("SAPA") and the Act on the Control of Organisations Which Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder ("ACO") where such investigations are necessary to prepare the adoption of control measures against certain organisations (126). Under both Acts, upon request by the Director-General of the PSIA the Public Security Examination Commission may issue certain "dispositions" (surveillance/prohibitions in the case of the ACO (127), dissolution/prohibitions in the case of the SAPA (128) and in this context the PSIA may carry out investigations (129). According to the information received, these investigations are always conducted on a voluntary basis, meaning that the PSIA may not force an owner of personal information to provide such information (130). Each time, controls and investigations shall be conducted only to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the control purpose and shall not under any circumstances be carried out to "unreasonably" restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of Japan (Article 3(1) of SAPA/ACO). Moreover, according to Article 3(2) of the SAPA/ACO, the PSIA must under no circumstances abuse such controls, or the investigations carried out to prepare such controls. If a Public Security Intelligence Officer has abused his/her authority under the respective Act by forcing a person to do anything which the person is not required to, or by interfering with the exercise of a person's rights, (s)he may be subject to criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 45 SAPA or Article 42 ACO. Finally, both Acts explicitly prescribe that their provisions, including the powers granted therein, shall "not under any circumstances be subject to an expanded interpretation" (Article 2 of SAPA/ACO).

In any event, the Administrative Organ has to take a written decision within a certain period (30 days, which under certain conditions can be extended by an additional 30 days). If the request is rejected, only partially granted, or if the individual for other reasons considers the conduct of the Administrative Organ to be "illegal or unjust", the individual may request administrative review based on the Administrative Complaint Review Act (141). In such a case, the head of the Administrative Organ deciding on the appeal shall consult the Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board (Articles 42, 43 APPIHAO), a specialised, independent board whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister with consent of both Houses of the Diet. According to the information received, the Review Board may carry out an examination (142) and in this respect request the Administrative Organ to provide the retained personal information, including any classified content, as well as further information and documents. While the ultimate report sent to the complainant as well as the Administrative Organ and made public is not legally binding, it is in almost all cases followed (143). Moreover, the individual has the possibility to challenge the appeal decision in court based on the Administrative Case Litigation Act. This opens the way for judicial control of the use of the national security exception(s), including of whether such an exception has been abused or is still justified.