(2)
Pursuant to Article 45(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the Commission may decide, by means of an implementing act, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third country or an international organisation ensure an adequate level of protection. Under this condition, transfers of personal data to that third country, territory, sector or international organisation can take place without the need to obtain any further authorisation, as provided for in Article 45(1) and recital 103 of the Regulation.
(4)
The Commission has carefully analysed Japanese law and practice. Based on the findings developed in recitals 6 to 175, the Commission concludes that Japan ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred to organisations falling within the scope of application of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (5) and subject to the additional conditions referred to in this Decision. These conditions are laid down in the Supplementary Rules (Annex I) adopted by the Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC) (6) and the official representations, assurances and commitments by the Japanese government to the European Commission (Annex II).
(68)
While the concept of "sensitive" data is inherently a social construct in that it is grounded in cultural and legal traditions, moral considerations, policy choices etc. of a given society, given the importance of ensuring adequate safeguards to sensitive data when transferred to business operators in Japan the Commission has obtained that the special protections afforded to "special care-required personal information" under Japanese law are extended to all categories recognised as "sensitive data" in Regulation (EU) 2016/679. To this end, Supplementary Rule (1) provides that data transferred from the European Union concerning an individual's sex life, sexual orientation or trade-union membership shall be processed by PIHBOs "in the same manner as special care-required personal information within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 3 of the [APPI]".
(96)
In Japan, the authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing the APPI is the PPC. It is composed of a Chairperson and eight Commissioners appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of both Houses of the Diet. The term of office for the Chairperson and each of the Commissioners is five years, with the possibility for reappointment (Article 64 of the APPI). Commissioners may only be dismissed for good cause in a limited set of exceptional circumstances (57) and must not be actively engaged in political activities. Moreover, under the APPI, full-time Commissioners must abstain from any other remunerated activities, or business activities. All Commissioners are also subject to internal rules preventing them from participation in deliberations in case of a possible conflict of interests. The PPC is assisted by a Secretariat, led by a Secretary-General, that has been established for the purpose of carrying out the tasks assigned to the PPC (Article 70 of the APPI). Both the Commissioners and all officials in the Secretariat are bound by strict rules of secrecy (Articles 72, 82 of the APPI).
(113)
The Commission has also assessed the limitations and safeguards, including the oversight and individual redress mechanisms available in Japanese law as regards the collection and subsequent use of personal data transferred to business operators in Japan by public authorities for public interest, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes ("government access"). In this respect, the Japanese government has provided the Commission with official representations, assurances and commitments signed at the highest ministerial and agency level that are contained in Annex II to this Decision.
(133)
While there is no ex-ante check by a judge in the case of requests for voluntary disclosure, business operators to whom such requests are addressed can object to them without risking any negative consequences (and will have to take into account the privacy impact of any disclosure). Moreover, according to Article 192(1) of the CCP, police officials shall always cooperate and coordinate their actions with the public prosecutor (and the Prefectural Public Safety Commission) (105). In turn, the public prosecutor may give the necessary general instructions setting forth standards for a fair investigation and/or issue specific orders with respect to an individual investigation (Article 193 of the CCP). Where such instructions and/or orders are not followed, the prosecution may file charges for disciplinary action (Article 194 of the CCP). Hence, the Prefectural Police operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor.
(135)
Third, also within the executive branch the Prefectural Police is subject to independent oversight. That includes in particular the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions established at prefectural level to ensure democratic administration and political neutrality of the police (108). These commissions are composed of members appointed by the Prefectural Governor with the consent of the Prefectural Assembly (from among citizens with no public servant position in the police in the five preceding years) and have a secure term of office (in particular only dismissal for good cause) (109). According to the information received, they are not subject to instructions, and thus can be considered as fully independent (110). As regards the tasks and powers of the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions, pursuant to Article 38(3) in conjunction with Articles 2 and 36(2) of the Police Law they are responsible for "the protection of [the] rights and freedom of an individual". To this effect, they are empowered to “supervise” (111) all investigatory activities of the Prefectural Police, including the collection of personal data. Notably, the commissions "may direct the [P]refectural [P]olice in detail or in a specific individual case of inspection of police personnel's misconduct, if necessary" (112). When the Chief of the Prefectural Police (113) receives such a direction or by him-/herself becomes aware of a possible case of misconduct (including the violation of laws or other neglect of duties), (s)he has to promptly inspect the case and report the inspection result to the Prefectural Public Safety Commission (Article 56(3) of the Police Law). Where the latter considers this necessary, it may also designate one of its members to review the status of implementation. The process continues until the Prefectural Public Safety Commission is satisfied that the incident has been appropriately addressed.
(136)
In addition, with respect to the correct application of the APPIHAO, the competent minister or agency head (e.g. the Commissioner General of the NPA) has enforcement authority, subject to the supervision by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC). According to Article 49 APPIHAO, the MIC "may collect reports on the status of enforcement of this Act" from the heads of Administrative Organs (Minister). That oversight function is supported by input from MIC's 51 "comprehensive information centres" (one in each Prefecture throughout Japan) that each year handle thousands of inquiries from individuals (114) (which, in turn, may reveal possible violations of the law). Where it considers this necessary for ensuring compliance with the Act, MIC may request the submission of explanations and materials, and issue opinions, concerning the handling of personal information by the concerned Administrative Organ (Articles 50, 51 APPIHAO).
(137)
In addition to ex officio oversight, individuals also have several possibilities for obtaining individual redress, both through independent authorities (such as the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions or the PPC) and the Japanese courts.
(139)
In addition, Article 79 of the Police Law guarantees individuals who have concerns with respect to the "execution of duties" by police personnel the right to lodge a complaint with the (competent) independent Prefectural Public Safety Commission. The Commission will "faithfully" handle such complaints in accordance with laws and local ordinances and shall notify the complainant in writing of the results. Based on its authority to supervise and "direct" the Prefectural Police with respect to "personnel's misconduct" (Articles 38(3), 43-2(1) of the Police Law), it may request the Prefectural Police to investigate the facts, take appropriate measures based on the outcome of this investigation and report on the results. If it considers that the investigation carried out by the Police has not been adequate, the Commission may also provide instructions on the handling of the complaint.
(140)
In order to facilitate complaint handling, the NPA has issued a "Notice" to the Police and Prefectural Public Safety Commissions on the proper handling of complaints regarding the execution of duties by police officers. In this document, the NPA stipulates standards for the interpretation and implementation of Article 79 of the Police Law. Among others, it requires the Prefectural Police to establish a "system for handling complaints" and to handle and report all complaints to the competent Prefectural Public Safety Commission "promptly". The Notice defines complaints as claims seeking correction "for any specific disadvantage that has been inflicted as the result of an illegal or inappropriate behaviour" (115) or "failure to take a necessary action, by a police officer in his/her execution of duty" (116), as well as any "grievance/discontent about inappropriate mode of duty execution by a police officer". The material scope of a complaint is thus broadly defined, covering any claim of unlawful collection of data, and the complainant does not have to demonstrate any harm suffered as a result of a police officer’s actions. Importantly, the Notice stipulates that foreigners (among others) shall be provided with assistance in formulating a complaint. Following a complaint, the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions are required to ensure that the Prefectural Police examines the facts, implements measures "according to the result of the examination" and reports on the results. Where the Commission considers the examination to be insufficient, it shall issue an instruction on the handling of the complaint, which the Prefectual Police is required to follow. Based on the reports received and the measures taken, the Commission notifies the individual indicating, among others, the measures taken to address the complaint. The NPA Notice stresses that complaints should be handled in a "sincere manner" and that the result should be notified "within the scope of time […] deemed appropriate in the light of the social norms and common sense".
(155)
Finally, the PSIA may carry out investigations under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act ("SAPA") and the Act on the Control of Organisations Which Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder ("ACO") where such investigations are necessary to prepare the adoption of control measures against certain organisations (126). Under both Acts, upon request by the Director-General of the PSIA the Public Security Examination Commission may issue certain "dispositions" (surveillance/prohibitions in the case of the ACO (127), dissolution/prohibitions in the case of the SAPA (128) and in this context the PSIA may carry out investigations (129). According to the information received, these investigations are always conducted on a voluntary basis, meaning that the PSIA may not force an owner of personal information to provide such information (130). Each time, controls and investigations shall be conducted only to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the control purpose and shall not under any circumstances be carried out to "unreasonably" restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of Japan (Article 3(1) of SAPA/ACO). Moreover, according to Article 3(2) of the SAPA/ACO, the PSIA must under no circumstances abuse such controls, or the investigations carried out to prepare such controls. If a Public Security Intelligence Officer has abused his/her authority under the respective Act by forcing a person to do anything which the person is not required to, or by interfering with the exercise of a person's rights, (s)he may be subject to criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 45 SAPA or Article 42 ACO. Finally, both Acts explicitly prescribe that their provisions, including the powers granted therein, shall "not under any circumstances be subject to an expanded interpretation" (Article 2 of SAPA/ACO).
(162)
As regards the Prefectural Police, oversight is ensured by the independent Prefectural Public Safety Commissions, as explained in recital 135 with respect to criminal law enforcement.
(163)
Finally, as indicated, the PSIA may only carry out investigations to the extent this is necessary with respect to the adoption of a prohibition, dissolution or surveillance disposition under the SAPA/ACO, and for these dispositions the independent (136) Public Security Examination Commission exercises ex ante oversight. In addition, regular/periodic inspections (which in a comprehensive manner look at PSIA's operations) (137) and special internal inspections (138) on the activities of individual departments/offices etc. are carried out by specifically designated inspectors and may lead to instructions to the heads of relevant departments etc. to take corrective or improvement measures.
(171)
The Commission considers that the APPI as complemented by the Supplementary Rules contained in Annex I, together with the official representations, assurances and commitments contained in Annex II, ensure a level of protection for personal data transferred from the European Union that is essentially equivalent to the one guaranteed by Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
(172)
Moreover, the Commission considers that, taken as a whole, the oversight mechanisms and redress avenues in Japanese law enable infringements by recipient PIHBOs to be identified and punished in practice and offer legal remedies to the data subject to obtain access to personal data relating to him/her and, eventually, the rectification or erasure of such data.
(173)
Finally, on the basis of the available information about the Japanese legal order, including the representations, assurances and commitments from the Japanese government contained in Annex II, the Commission considers that any interference with the fundamental rights of the individuals whose personal data are transferred from the European Union to Japan by Japanese public authorities for public interest purposes, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes, will be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question, and that effective legal protection against such interference exists.
(174)
Therefore, in the light of the findings of this Decision, the Commission considers that Japan ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred from the European Union to PIHBOs in Japan that are subject to the APPI, except in those cases where the recipient falls within one of the categories listed in Article 76(1) APPI and all or part of the purposes of processing correspond(s) to one of the purposes prescribed in that provision.
(175)
On this basis, the Commission concludes that the adequacy standard of Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, interpreted in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular in the Schrems judgment (146), is met.
(176)
According to the case law of the Court of Justice (147), and as recognized in Article 45(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the Commission should continuously monitor relevant developments in the third country after the adoption of an adequacy decision in order to assess whether Japan still ensures an essentially equivalent level of protection. Such a check is required, in any event, when the Commission receives information giving rise to a justified doubt in that respect.
(177)
Therefore, the Commission should on an on-going basis monitor the situation as regards the legal framework and actual practice for the processing of personal data as assessed in this Decision, including compliance by the Japanese authorities with the representations, assurances and commitments contained in Annex II. To facilitate this process, the Japanese authorities are expected to inform the Commission of material developments relevant to this Decision, both as regards the processing of personal data by business operators and the limitations and safeguards applicable to access to personal data by public authorities. This should include any decisions adopted by the PPC under Article 24 of the APPI recognising a third country as providing an equivalent level of protection to the one guaranteed in Japan.
(178)
Moreover, in order to allow the Commission to effectively carry out its monitoring function, the Member States should inform the Commission about any relevant action undertaken by the national data protection authorities ("DPAs"), in particular regarding queries or complaints by EU data subjects concerning the transfer of personal data from the European Union to business operators in Japan. The Commission should also be informed about any indications that the actions of Japanese public authorities responsible for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, or for national security, including any oversight bodies, do not ensure the required level of protection.
(179)
Member States and their organs are required to take the measures necessary to comply with acts of the Union institutions, as the latter are presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an action for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a preliminary ruling or a plea of illegality. Consequently, a Commission adequacy decision adopted pursuant to Article 45(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is binding on all organs of the Member States to which it is addressed, including their independent supervisory authorities. At the same time, as explained by the Court of Justice in the Schrems judgment (148) and recognised in Article 58(5) of the Regulation, where a DPA questions, including upon a complaint, the compatibility of a Commission adequacy decision with the fundamental rights of the individual to privacy and data protection, national law must provide it with a legal remedy to put those objections before a national court which, in case of doubts, must stay proceedings and make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice (149).
(180)
In application of Article 45(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (150), and in the light of the fact that the level of protection afforded by the Japanese legal order may be liable to change, the Commission, following the adoption of this Decision, should periodically check whether the findings relating to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured by Japan are still factually and legally justified.
(181)
To this end, this Decision should be subject to a first review within two years after its entry into force. Following that first review, and depending on its outcome, the Commission will decide in close consultation with the Committee established under Article 93(1) of the GDPR whether the two-year-cycle should be maintained. In any case, the subsequent reviews should take place at least every four years (151). The review should cover all aspects of the functioning of this Decision, and in particular the application of the Supplementary Rules (with special attention paid to protections afforded in case of onward transfers), the application of the rules on consent, including in case of withdrawal, the effectiveness of the exercise of individual rights, as well as the limitations and safeguards with respect to government access, including the redress mechanism as set out in Annex II to this Decision. It should also cover the effectiveness of oversight and enforcement, as regards the rules applicable to both PIHBOs and in the area of criminal law enforcement and national security.
(182)
To perform the review, the Commission should meet with the PPC, accompanied, where appropriate, by other Japanese authorities responsible for government access, including relevant oversight bodies. The participation in this meeting should be open to representatives of the members of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). In the framework of the Joint Review, the Commission should request the PPC to provide comprehensive information on all aspects relevant for the adequacy finding, including on the limitations and safeguards concerning government access (152). The Commission should also seek explanations on any information relevant for this Decision that it has received, including public reports by Japanese authorities or other stakeholders in Japan, the EDPB, individual DPAs, civil society groups, media reports, or any other available source of information.
(183)
On the basis of the Joint Review, the Commission should prepare a public report to be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council.
(184)
Where, on the basis of the regular and ad hoc checks or any other information available, the Commission concludes that the level of protection afforded by the Japanese legal order can no longer be regarded as essentially equivalent to that in the European Union, it should inform the competent Japanese authorities thereof and request that appropriate measures be taken within a specified, reasonable timeframe. This includes the rules applicable to both business operators and Japanese public authorities responsible for criminal law enforcement or national security. For example, such a procedure would be triggered in cases where onward transfers, including on the basis of decisions adopted by the PPC under Article 24 of the APPI recognising a third country as providing an equivalent level of protection to the one guaranteed in Japan, will no longer be carried out under safeguards ensuring the continuity of protection within the meaning of Article 44 of the GDPR.
(185)
If, after the specified time period, the competent Japanese authorities fail to demonstrate satisfactorily that this Decision continues to be based on an adequate level of protection, the Commission should, in application of Article 45(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, initiate the procedure leading to the partial or complete suspension or repeal of this Decision. Alternatively, the Commission should initiate the procedure to amend this Decision, in particular by subjecting data transfers to additional conditions or by limiting the scope of the adequacy finding only to data transfers for which the continuity of protection within the meaning of Article 44 of the GDPR is ensured.
(186)
In particular, the Commission should initiate the procedure for suspension or repeal in case of indications that the Supplementary Rules contained in Annex I are not complied with by business operators receiving personal data under this Decision and/or are not effectively enforced, or that the Japanese authorities fail to comply with the representations, assurances and commitments contained in Annex II to this Decision.
(187)
The Commission should also consider initiating the procedure leading to the amendment, suspension or repeal of this Decision if, in the context of the Joint Review or otherwise, the competent Japanese authorities fail to provide the information or clarifications necessary for the assessment of the level of protection afforded to personal data transferred from the European Union to Japan or compliance with this Decision. In this respect, the Commission should take into account the extent to which the relevant information can be obtained from other sources.
(188)
On duly justified grounds of urgency, such as a risk of serious infringment of data subjects’ rights, the Commission should consider adopting a decision to suspend or repeal this Decision that should apply immediately, pursuant to Article 93(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 in conjunction with Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (153).
(190)
The European Parliament has adopted a resolution on a digital trade strategy that calls on the Commission to prioritise and speed up the adoption of adequacy decisions with important trading partners under the conditions laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as an important mechanism to safeguard the transfer of personal data from the European Union (155). The European Parliament has also adopted a resolution on the adequacy of the protection of personal data afforded by Japan (156).