As specified in Article 45(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the adoption of an adequacy decision has to be based on a comprehensive analysis of the third country's legal order, with respect to both the rules applicable to the data importers and the limitations and safeguards as regards access to personal data by public authorities. The assessment has to determine whether the third country in question guarantees a level of protection "essentially equivalent" to that ensured within the European Union (recital 104 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679). As clarified by the Court of Justice of the European Union, this does not require an identical level of protection (2). In particular, the means to which the third country in question has recourse may differ from the ones employed in the European Union, as long as they prove, in practice, effective for ensuring an adequate level of protection (3). The adequacy standard therefore does not require a point-to-point replication of Union rules. Rather, the test lies in whether, through the substance of privacy rights and their effective implementation, supervision and enforcement, the foreign system as a whole delivers the required level of protection (4).

Article 13 of the Constitution states:

"All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs."

Based on that Article, the Japanese Supreme Court has clarified the rights of individuals as regards the protection of personal information. In a decision of 1969, it recognised the right to privacy and data protection as a constitutional right (8). Notably, the Court held that "every individual has the liberty of protecting his/her own personal information from being disclosed to a third party or made public without good reason." Moreover, in a decision of 6 March 2008 ("Juki-Net") (9), the Supreme Court held that "citizens’ liberty in private life shall be protected against the exercise of public authority, and it can be construed that, as one of an individual's liberties in private life, every individual has the liberty of protecting his/her own personal information from being disclosed to a third party or being made public without good reason" (10).

The two latter acts (amended in 2016) contain provisions applicable to the protection of personal information by public sector entities. Data processing falling within the scope of application of those acts is not the object of the adequacy finding contained in this Decision, which is limited to the protection of personal information by "Personal Information Handling Business Operators" (PIHBOs) within the meaning of the APPI.

Certain provisions of the APPI, notably Articles 27 to 30 relating to individual rights, apply only to a specific category of personal data, namely "retained personal data". Those are defined under Article 2(7) of the APPI as personal data other than those which are either (i) "prescribed by cabinet order as likely to harm the public or other interests if their presence or absence is made known"; or (ii) "set to be deleted within a period of no longer than one year that is prescribed by cabinet order".

As regards the first of those two categories, it is explained in Article 4 of the Cabinet Order and covers four types of exemptions (20). These exemptions pursue similar objectives as those listed in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, notably protection of the data subject ("principal" in the terminology of the APPI) and the freedom of others, national security, public security, criminal law enforcement or other important objectives of general public interest. In addition, it results from the wording of Article 4(1)(i)-(iv) of the Cabinet Order that their application always presupposes a specific risk for one of the protected important interests (21).

Under the APPI, when a PIHBO collects personal information, it is required to specify the purpose of utilising the personal information in a detailed manner (29) and promptly inform the data subject of (or disclose to the public) this utilisation purpose (30). In addition, Article 17 of the APPI provides that a PIHBO shall not acquire personal information by deceit or other improper means. As regards certain categories of data such as special-care required personal information, their acquisition requires the consent of the data subject (Article 17(2) of the APPI).

Article 18(1) of the APPI requires the PIHBO to make information about the utilisation purpose of the personal information acquired available to the data subject, except for "cases where a utilisation purpose has been disclosed in advance to the public". The same obligation applies in case of a permissible change of purpose (Article 18(3)). This also ensures that the data subject is informed of the fact that his/her data has been collected. Although the APPI does not generally require the PIHBO to inform the data subject about the expected recipients of personal information at the stage of collection, such information is a necessary condition for any subsequent disclosure of information to a third party (recipient) based on Article 23(2), hence where this is done without prior consent of the data subject.

Both the requirements of Article 18 and the obligation to inform about the utilisation purpose under Article 27 of the APPI are subject to the same set of exceptions, mostly based on public interest considerations and the protection of rights and interests of the data subject, third parties and the controller (37). According to the interpretation developed in the PPC Guidelines, those exceptions apply in very specific situations, such as where information on the utilisation purpose would risk undermining legitimate measures taken by the business operator to protect certain interests (e.g. fight against fraud, industrial espionage, sabotage).

Finally, the APPI creates a framework for the participation of sectoral industry organisations in ensuring a high level of compliance (see Chapter IV, Section 4). The role of such accredited personal information protection organisations (40) is to promote the protection of personal information by supporting businesses through their expertise, but also to contribute to the implementation of safeguards, notably by handling individual complaints and helping to solve related conflicts. To that end, they may request participating PIHBOs, if appropriate, to adopt necessary measures (41). Moreover, in case of data breaches or other security incidents PHIBOs shall in principle inform the PPC as well as the data subject (or the public) and take necessary action, including measures to minimise any damage and to prevent any recurrence of similar incidents (42). While those are voluntary schemes, on 10 August 2017 the PPC had listed 44 organisations, with the largest one, Japan Information Processing and Development Center (JIPDEC), alone counting 15 436 participating business operators (43). Accredited schemes include sector associations such as for instance the Japan Securities Dealers Association, the Japan Association of Car Driving Schools or the Association of Marriage Brokers (44).

These rights are subject to three types of restrictions, relating to the individual's own or third parties’ rights and interests (51), serious interference with the PIHBO's business operations (52) as well as cases in which disclosure would violate other laws or regulations (53). The situations in which these restrictions would apply are similar to some of the exceptions applicable under Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which allows for restrictions of the rights of individuals for reasons related to the "protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others" or "other important objectives of general public interest". Although the category of cases in which disclosure would violate "other laws or regulations" may appear broad, laws and regulations providing for limitations in this regard must respect the constitutional right to privacy and may impose restrictions only to the extent that the exercise of this right would "interfere with the public welfare" (54). This requires a balancing of the interests at stake.

Third, in addition to civil law (tort) remedies, a data subject may file a complaint with a public prosecutor or judicial police official with respect to APPI violations that can lead to criminal sanctions. Chapter VII of the APPI contains a number of penal provisions. The most important one (Article 84) relates to non-compliance by the PIHBO with PPC orders pursuant to Article 42(2) and (3). If a business operator fails to comply with an order issued by the PPC, the PPC Chair (as well as any other government official) (66) may forward the case to the public prosecutor or judicial police official and in that way trigger the opening of a criminal procedure. The penalty for the violation of a PPC order is imprisonment with labour for up to six months or a fine of up to 300 000 yen. Other provisions of the APPI providing for sanctions in case of APPI violations affecting the rights and interests of data subjects include Article 83 of the APPI (regarding the "providing or using by stealth" of a personal information database "for the purpose of seeking […] illegal profits") and Article 88(i) of the APPI (regarding the failure by a third party to correctly inform the PIHBO when the latter receives personal data in accordance with Article 26(1) of the APPI, in particular on the details of the third party's own, prior acquisition of such data). The applicable penalties for such violations of the APPI are, respectively, imprisonment with work for up to one year or a fine of up to 500 000 yen (in case of Article 83) or an administrative fine of up to 100 000 yen (in case of Article 88(i)). While the threat of a criminal sanction is already likely to have a strong deterrent effect on the business management that directs the PIHBO's processing operations as well as on the individuals handling the data, Article 87 of the APPI clarifies that when a representative, employee or other worker of a corporate body has committed a violation pursuant to Articles 83 to 85 of the APPI, "the actor shall be punished and a fine set forth in the respective Articles shall be imposed on the said corporate body". In this case, both the employee and the company can be imposed sanctions up to the full maximum amount.

The Commission has also assessed the limitations and safeguards, including the oversight and individual redress mechanisms available in Japanese law as regards the collection and subsequent use of personal data transferred to business operators in Japan by public authorities for public interest, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes ("government access"). In this respect, the Japanese government has provided the Commission with official representations, assurances and commitments signed at the highest ministerial and agency level that are contained in Annex II to this Decision.

As an exercise of public authority, government access in Japan must be carried out in full respect of the law (legality principle). In this regard, the Constitution of Japan contains provisions limiting and framing the collection of personal data by public authorities. As already mentioned with respect to processing by business operators, basing itself on Article 13 of the Constitution which among others protects the right to liberty, the Supreme Court of Japan has recognised the right to privacy and data protection (72). One important aspect of that right is the freedom not to have one's personal information disclosed to a third party without permission (73). This implies a right to the effective protection of personal data against abuse and (in particular) illegal access. Additional protection is ensured by Article 35 of the Constitution on the right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects, which requires from public authorities to obtain a court warrant issued for "adequate cause" (74) in all cases of "searches and seizures". In its judgment of 15 March 2017 (GPS case), the Supreme Court has clarified that this warrant requirement applies whenever the government invades ("enters into") the private sphere in a way that suppresses the individual's will and thus by means of a "compulsory investigation". A judge may only issue such warrant based on a concrete suspicion of crimes, i.e. when provided with documentary evidence based on which the person concerned by the investigation can be considered as having committed a criminal offence (75). Consequently, Japanese authorities have no legal authority to collect personal information by compulsory means in situations where no violation of the law has yet occurred (76), for example in order to prevent a crime or other security threat (as is the case for investigations on grounds of national security).

Importantly, Article 21(2) of the Constitution guarantees the secrecy of all means of communication, with limitations only allowed by legislation on public interest grounds. Article 4 of the Telecommunications Business Act, according to which the secrecy of communications handled by a telecommunications carrier shall not be violated, implements this confidentiality requirement at the level of statutory law. This has been interpreted as prohibiting the disclosure of communications information, except with the consent of users or if based on one of the explicit exemptions from criminal liability under the Penal Code (77).

The Constitution also guarantees the right of access to the courts (Article 32) and the right to sue the State for redress in the case where an individual has suffered damage through the illegal act of a public official (Article 17).

As regards specifically the right to data protection, Chapter III, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the APPI lays down general principles covering all sectors, including the public sector. In particular, Article 3 of the APPI provides that all personal information must be handled in accordance with the principle of respect for the personality of individuals. Once personal information, including as part of electronic records, has been collected ("obtained") by public authorities (78), its handling is governed by the Act on the Protection of Personal Information held by Administrative Organs ("APPIHAO") (79). This includes in principle (80) also the processing of personal information for criminal law enforcement or national security purposes. Among others, the APPIHAO provides that public authorities: (i) may only retain personal information to the extent this is necessary for carrying out their duties; (ii) shall not use such information for an "unjust" purpose or disclose it to a third person without justification; (iii) shall specify the purpose and not change that purpose beyond what can reasonably be considered as relevant for the original purpose (purpose limitation); (iv) shall in principle not use or provide a third person with the retained personal information for other purposes and, if they consider this necessary, impose restrictions on the purpose or method of use by third parties; (v) shall endeavour to ensure the correctness of the information (data quality); (vi) shall take the necessary measures for the proper management of the information and to prevent leakage, loss or damage (data security); and (vii) shall endeavour to properly and expeditiously process any complaints regarding the processing of the information (81).

More specifically, pursuant to Article 218(1) of the CCP, a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for the investigation of an offence, conduct a search or seizure (including ordering records) upon a warrant issued by a judge in advance (83). Among others, such a warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offence (84), the electromagnetic records to be seized and the "place or articles" to be inspected (Article 219(1) of the CCP).

As regards the interception of communications, Article 3 of the Wiretapping Act authorises such measures only under strict requirements. In particular, the public authorities have to obtain a prior court warrant that may only be issued for the investigation of specific serious crimes (listed in the Annex to the Act) (85) and when it is "extremely difficult to identify the criminal or clarify the situations/details of the perpetration by any other ways" (86). Under Article 5 of the Wiretapping Act, the warrant is issued for a limited period of time and additional conditions may be imposed by the judge. Moreover, the Wiretapping Act provides for a number of further guarantees, such as for instance the necessary attendance of witnesses (Articles 12, 20), the prohibition to wiretap the communications of certain privileged groups (e.g. doctors, lawyers) (Article 15), the obligation to terminate the wiretapping if it is no longer justified, even within the period of validity of the warrant (Article 18), or the general requirement to notify the individual concerned and allow access to the records within thirty days after the wiretapping has been terminated (Articles 23, 24).

Within the limits of their competence, public authorities may also collect electronic information based on requests for voluntary disclosure. This refers to a non-compulsory form of cooperation where compliance with the request cannot be enforced (88), thus relieving the public authorities from the duty of obtaining a court warrant.

Aside from these limitations for the exercise of public authority, business operators themselves are expected to check ("confirm") the necessity and "rationality" of the provision to a third party (99). This includes the question whether they are prevented by law from cooperating. Such conflicting legal obligations may in particular follow from confidentiality obligations such as Article 134 of the Penal Code (concerning the relationship between a doctor, lawyer, priest, etc. and his/her client). Also, "any person engaged in the telecommunication business shall, while in office, maintain the secrets of others that have come to be known with respect to communications being handled by the telecommunication carrier" (Article 4(2) of the Telecommunication Business Act). This obligation is backed-up by the sanction stipulated in Article 179 of the Telecommunication Business Act, according to which any person that has violated the secrecy of communications being handled by a telecommunications carrier shall be guilty of a criminal offence and punished by imprisonment with labour of up to two years, or to a fine of not more than one million yen (100). While this requirement is not absolute and in particular allows for measures infringing the secrecy of communications that constitute "justifiable acts" within the meaning of Article 35 of the Penal Code (101), this exception does not cover the response to non-compulsory requests by public authorities for the disclosure of electronic information pursuant to Article 197(2) of the CCP.

While there is no ex-ante check by a judge in the case of requests for voluntary disclosure, business operators to whom such requests are addressed can object to them without risking any negative consequences (and will have to take into account the privacy impact of any disclosure). Moreover, according to Article 192(1) of the CCP, police officials shall always cooperate and coordinate their actions with the public prosecutor (and the Prefectural Public Safety Commission) (105). In turn, the public prosecutor may give the necessary general instructions setting forth standards for a fair investigation and/or issue specific orders with respect to an individual investigation (Article 193 of the CCP). Where such instructions and/or orders are not followed, the prosecution may file charges for disciplinary action (Article 194 of the CCP). Hence, the Prefectural Police operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor.

Second, according to Article 62 of the Constitution, each House of the Japanese parliament (the Diet) may conduct investigations in relation to the government, including with respect to the lawfulness of information collection by the police. To that end, it may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and/or the production of records. Those powers of inquiry are further specified in the Diet Law, in particular Chapter XII. In particular, Article 104 of the Diet Law provides that the Cabinet, public agencies and other parts of the government "must comply with the requests of a House or any of its Committees for the production of reports and records necessary for consideration of investigation." Refusal to comply is allowed only if the government provides a plausible reason found acceptable by the Diet, or upon issuance of a formal declaration that the production of the reports or records would be "gravely detrimental to the national interest" (106). In addition, Diet members may ask written questions to the Cabinet (Articles 74, 75 of the Diet Law), and in the past such "written inquiries" have also addressed the handling of personal information by the administration (107). The Diet's role in supervising the executive is supported by reporting obligations, for instance pursuant to Article 29 of the Wiretapping Act.

Third, also within the executive branch the Prefectural Police is subject to independent oversight. That includes in particular the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions established at prefectural level to ensure democratic administration and political neutrality of the police (108). These commissions are composed of members appointed by the Prefectural Governor with the consent of the Prefectural Assembly (from among citizens with no public servant position in the police in the five preceding years) and have a secure term of office (in particular only dismissal for good cause) (109). According to the information received, they are not subject to instructions, and thus can be considered as fully independent (110). As regards the tasks and powers of the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions, pursuant to Article 38(3) in conjunction with Articles 2 and 36(2) of the Police Law they are responsible for "the protection of [the] rights and freedom of an individual". To this effect, they are empowered to “supervise” (111) all investigatory activities of the Prefectural Police, including the collection of personal data. Notably, the commissions "may direct the [P]refectural [P]olice in detail or in a specific individual case of inspection of police personnel's misconduct, if necessary" (112). When the Chief of the Prefectural Police (113) receives such a direction or by him-/herself becomes aware of a possible case of misconduct (including the violation of laws or other neglect of duties), (s)he has to promptly inspect the case and report the inspection result to the Prefectural Public Safety Commission (Article 56(3) of the Police Law). Where the latter considers this necessary, it may also designate one of its members to review the status of implementation. The process continues until the Prefectural Public Safety Commission is satisfied that the incident has been appropriately addressed.

In addition to ex officio oversight, individuals also have several possibilities for obtaining individual redress, both through independent authorities (such as the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions or the PPC) and the Japanese courts.

In addition, Article 79 of the Police Law guarantees individuals who have concerns with respect to the "execution of duties" by police personnel the right to lodge a complaint with the (competent) independent Prefectural Public Safety Commission. The Commission will "faithfully" handle such complaints in accordance with laws and local ordinances and shall notify the complainant in writing of the results. Based on its authority to supervise and "direct" the Prefectural Police with respect to "personnel's misconduct" (Articles 38(3), 43-2(1) of the Police Law), it may request the Prefectural Police to investigate the facts, take appropriate measures based on the outcome of this investigation and report on the results. If it considers that the investigation carried out by the Police has not been adequate, the Commission may also provide instructions on the handling of the complaint.

In order to facilitate complaint handling, the NPA has issued a "Notice" to the Police and Prefectural Public Safety Commissions on the proper handling of complaints regarding the execution of duties by police officers. In this document, the NPA stipulates standards for the interpretation and implementation of Article 79 of the Police Law. Among others, it requires the Prefectural Police to establish a "system for handling complaints" and to handle and report all complaints to the competent Prefectural Public Safety Commission "promptly". The Notice defines complaints as claims seeking correction "for any specific disadvantage that has been inflicted as the result of an illegal or inappropriate behaviour" (115) or "failure to take a necessary action, by a police officer in his/her execution of duty" (116), as well as any "grievance/discontent about inappropriate mode of duty execution by a police officer". The material scope of a complaint is thus broadly defined, covering any claim of unlawful collection of data, and the complainant does not have to demonstrate any harm suffered as a result of a police officer’s actions. Importantly, the Notice stipulates that foreigners (among others) shall be provided with assistance in formulating a complaint. Following a complaint, the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions are required to ensure that the Prefectural Police examines the facts, implements measures "according to the result of the examination" and reports on the results. Where the Commission considers the examination to be insufficient, it shall issue an instruction on the handling of the complaint, which the Prefectual Police is required to follow. Based on the reports received and the measures taken, the Commission notifies the individual indicating, among others, the measures taken to address the complaint. The NPA Notice stresses that complaints should be handled in a "sincere manner" and that the result should be notified "within the scope of time […] deemed appropriate in the light of the social norms and common sense".

Second, given that redress will naturally have to be sought abroad in a foreign system and in a foreign language, in order to facilitate redress for EU individuals whose personal data is transferred to business operators in Japan and then accessed by public authorities, the Japanese government has made use of its powers to create a specific mechanism, administered and supervised by PPC, for handling and resolving complaints in this field. That mechanism builds on the cooperation obligation imposed on Japanese public authorities under the APPI and the special role of the PPC with respect to international data transfers from third countries under Article 6 of the APPI and the Basic Policy (as established by the Japanese government through Cabinet Order). The details of this mechanism are set out in the official representations, assurances and commitments received from the Japanese government and attached to this Decision as Annex II. The mechanism is not subject to any standing requirement and is open to any individual, independently of whether (s)he is suspected or accused of a criminal offence.

Under the mechanism, an individual who suspects that his/her data transferred from the European Union has been collected or used by public authorities in Japan (including those responsible for criminal law enforcement) in violation of the applicable rules can submit a complaint to the PPC (individually or though his/her data protection authority within the meaning of Article 51 of the GDPR). The PPC will be under an obligation to handle the complaint and in a first step inform the competent public authorities, including the relevant oversight bodies, thereof. Those authorities are required to cooperate with the PPC, "including by providing the necessary information and relevant material, so that the PPC can evaluate whether the collection or the subsequent use of personal information has taken place in compliance with the applicable rules" (117). This obligation, derived from Article 80 of the APPI (requiring Japanese public authorities to co-operate with PPC), applies in general and hence extends to the review of any investigatory measures taken by such authorities, which moreover have committed to such cooperation through written assurances from the competent ministries and agency heads, as reflected in Annex II.

If the evaluation shows that an infringment of the applicable rules has occurred, "cooperation by the concerned public authorities with the PPC includes the obligation to remedy the violation", which in case of the unlawful collection of personal information covers the deletion of such data. Importantly, this obligation is carried out under the supervision of the PPC which will "confirm, before concluding the evaluation, that the violation has been fully remedied".

Once the evaluation is concluded, the PPC shall notify the individual within a reasonable period of time of the outcome of the evaluation, including any corrective action taken where applicable. At the same time, the PPC shall also inform the individual about the possibility of seeking a confirmation of the outcome from the competent public authority and the identity of the authority to which such a request for confirmation should be made. The possibility to receive such a confirmation, including the reasons underpinning the decision of the competent authority, may be of assistance to the individual in taking any further steps, including when seeking judicial redress. Detailed information on the outcome of the evaluation can be restricted as long as there are reasonable grounds to consider that communicating such information is likely to pose a risk to the ongoing investigation.

Finally, under Article 1(1) of the State Redress Act a court may grant compensation where a public officer who exercises the public authority of the State has, in the course of his/her duties, unlawfully and with fault (intentionally or negligently) inflicted damage on the individual concerned. According to Article 4 of the State Redress Act, the State's liability for damages is based on the provisions of the Civil Code. In this respect, Article 710 of the Civil Code stipulates that liability also covers damages other than those to property, and hence moral damage (for instance in the form of "mental distress"). This includes cases where the privacy of an individual has been invaded by unlawful surveillance and/or the collection of his/her personal information (e.g. the illegal execution of a warrant) (121).

In addition to monetary compensation, individuals may under certain conditions also obtain injunctive relief (e.g. the deletion of personal data collected by public authorities) based on their privacy rights under Article 13 of the Constitution (122).

Also, according to the information received only four government entities are empowered to collect electronic information held by Japanese business operators on national security grounds, namely: (i) the Cabinet Intelligence & Research Office (CIRO); (ii) the Ministry of Defence ("MOD"); (iii) the police (both National Police Agency (NPA) (125) and Prefectural Police); and (iv) the Public Security Intelligence Agency ("PSIA"). However, the CIRO never collects information directly from business operators, including by means of interception of communications. Where it receives information from other government authorities in order to provide analysis to the Cabinet, these other authorities in turn have to comply with the law, including the limitations and safeguards analysed in this Decision. Its activities are thus not relevant in a transfer context.

As for the Prefectural Police, its responsibilities and duties include the "maintenance of public safety and order" (Article 35(2) in conjunction with Article 2(1) of the Police Law). Within this scope of jurisdiction, the police may collect information, but only on a voluntary basis without legal force. Moreover, the activities of the police shall be "strictly limited" to what is necessary to perform its duties. Moreover, it shall act in an "impartial, nonpartisan, unprejudiced and fair" manner and never abuse its powers "in any way such as to interfere with the rights and liberties of an individual guaranteed in the Constitution of Japan" (Article 2 of the Police Law).

Finally, the PSIA may carry out investigations under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act ("SAPA") and the Act on the Control of Organisations Which Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder ("ACO") where such investigations are necessary to prepare the adoption of control measures against certain organisations (126). Under both Acts, upon request by the Director-General of the PSIA the Public Security Examination Commission may issue certain "dispositions" (surveillance/prohibitions in the case of the ACO (127), dissolution/prohibitions in the case of the SAPA (128) and in this context the PSIA may carry out investigations (129). According to the information received, these investigations are always conducted on a voluntary basis, meaning that the PSIA may not force an owner of personal information to provide such information (130). Each time, controls and investigations shall be conducted only to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the control purpose and shall not under any circumstances be carried out to "unreasonably" restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of Japan (Article 3(1) of SAPA/ACO). Moreover, according to Article 3(2) of the SAPA/ACO, the PSIA must under no circumstances abuse such controls, or the investigations carried out to prepare such controls. If a Public Security Intelligence Officer has abused his/her authority under the respective Act by forcing a person to do anything which the person is not required to, or by interfering with the exercise of a person's rights, (s)he may be subject to criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 45 SAPA or Article 42 ACO. Finally, both Acts explicitly prescribe that their provisions, including the powers granted therein, shall "not under any circumstances be subject to an expanded interpretation" (Article 2 of SAPA/ACO).

Also, once collected, any personal information retained by public authorities for national security purposes will fall under and thus benefit from the protections under the APPIHAO when it comes to its subsequent storage, use and disclosure (see recital 118).

As regards the Prefectural Police, oversight is ensured by the independent Prefectural Public Safety Commissions, as explained in recital 135 with respect to criminal law enforcement.

Finally, as indicated, the PSIA may only carry out investigations to the extent this is necessary with respect to the adoption of a prohibition, dissolution or surveillance disposition under the SAPA/ACO, and for these dispositions the independent (136) Public Security Examination Commission exercises ex ante oversight. In addition, regular/periodic inspections (which in a comprehensive manner look at PSIA's operations) (137) and special internal inspections (138) on the activities of individual departments/offices etc. are carried out by specifically designated inspectors and may lead to instructions to the heads of relevant departments etc. to take corrective or improvement measures.

In any event, the Administrative Organ has to take a written decision within a certain period (30 days, which under certain conditions can be extended by an additional 30 days). If the request is rejected, only partially granted, or if the individual for other reasons considers the conduct of the Administrative Organ to be "illegal or unjust", the individual may request administrative review based on the Administrative Complaint Review Act (141). In such a case, the head of the Administrative Organ deciding on the appeal shall consult the Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board (Articles 42, 43 APPIHAO), a specialised, independent board whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister with consent of both Houses of the Diet. According to the information received, the Review Board may carry out an examination (142) and in this respect request the Administrative Organ to provide the retained personal information, including any classified content, as well as further information and documents. While the ultimate report sent to the complainant as well as the Administrative Organ and made public is not legally binding, it is in almost all cases followed (143). Moreover, the individual has the possibility to challenge the appeal decision in court based on the Administrative Case Litigation Act. This opens the way for judicial control of the use of the national security exception(s), including of whether such an exception has been abused or is still justified.

Finally, on the basis of the available information about the Japanese legal order, including the representations, assurances and commitments from the Japanese government contained in Annex II, the Commission considers that any interference with the fundamental rights of the individuals whose personal data are transferred from the European Union to Japan by Japanese public authorities for public interest purposes, in particular criminal law enforcement and national security purposes, will be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question, and that effective legal protection against such interference exists.

Therefore, the Commission should on an on-going basis monitor the situation as regards the legal framework and actual practice for the processing of personal data as assessed in this Decision, including compliance by the Japanese authorities with the representations, assurances and commitments contained in Annex II. To facilitate this process, the Japanese authorities are expected to inform the Commission of material developments relevant to this Decision, both as regards the processing of personal data by business operators and the limitations and safeguards applicable to access to personal data by public authorities. This should include any decisions adopted by the PPC under Article 24 of the APPI recognising a third country as providing an equivalent level of protection to the one guaranteed in Japan.

Moreover, in order to allow the Commission to effectively carry out its monitoring function, the Member States should inform the Commission about any relevant action undertaken by the national data protection authorities ("DPAs"), in particular regarding queries or complaints by EU data subjects concerning the transfer of personal data from the European Union to business operators in Japan. The Commission should also be informed about any indications that the actions of Japanese public authorities responsible for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, or for national security, including any oversight bodies, do not ensure the required level of protection.

To perform the review, the Commission should meet with the PPC, accompanied, where appropriate, by other Japanese authorities responsible for government access, including relevant oversight bodies. The participation in this meeting should be open to representatives of the members of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). In the framework of the Joint Review, the Commission should request the PPC to provide comprehensive information on all aspects relevant for the adequacy finding, including on the limitations and safeguards concerning government access (152). The Commission should also seek explanations on any information relevant for this Decision that it has received, including public reports by Japanese authorities or other stakeholders in Japan, the EDPB, individual DPAs, civil society groups, media reports, or any other available source of information.

On the basis of the Joint Review, the Commission should prepare a public report to be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council.

Where, on the basis of the regular and ad hoc checks or any other information available, the Commission concludes that the level of protection afforded by the Japanese legal order can no longer be regarded as essentially equivalent to that in the European Union, it should inform the competent Japanese authorities thereof and request that appropriate measures be taken within a specified, reasonable timeframe. This includes the rules applicable to both business operators and Japanese public authorities responsible for criminal law enforcement or national security. For example, such a procedure would be triggered in cases where onward transfers, including on the basis of decisions adopted by the PPC under Article 24 of the APPI recognising a third country as providing an equivalent level of protection to the one guaranteed in Japan, will no longer be carried out under safeguards ensuring the continuity of protection within the meaning of Article 44 of the GDPR.