FBI employee Indictment
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENDRA KINGSBURY,
[DOB: 10/4/1972]
Defendant.
Case No. __________________________
COUNTS ONE AND TWO:
Willful Retention of National Defense
Information
18 U.S.C. § 793(e)
NMT: 10 years’ imprisonment
NMT: $250,000 fine
NMT: 3 years’ supervised release
Class C felony
$100 mandatory special assessment per count
I N D I C T M E N T
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:
At all times relevant to this Indictment:
General Allegations
1. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant, was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), Kansas City Division, in the position of Intelligence Analyst. In her position as
Intelligence Analyst, the defendant was assigned to a sequence of different FBI “squads,” each of
which had a particular focus, such as, illegal drug trafficking, violent crime, violent gangs, and
counterintelligence. In connection with her FBI employment, and in furtherance of her duties as
an Intelligence Analyst, the defendant held a TOP SECRET//SCI security clearance and had
access to national defense and classified information.
Classified Information
2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as amended by
Executive Order 13292 on March 25, 2003, and Executive Order 13526 on December 29, 2009,
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 1 of 7
2
national security information was classified as “TOP SECRET,” “SECRET,” or
“CONFIDENTIAL.” National security information was information owned by, produced by,
produced for, and under the control of the United States government that was classified as
follows:
A. Information was classified as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure
of that information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security that the original classification authority was able to identify and
describe.
B. Information was classified as SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of
that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security that the original classification authority was able to identify and describe.
C. Information was classified as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized
disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security that the original classification authority was able to identify and
describe.
2. Access to national security information classified at any level could be further
restricted through compartmentation in Sensitive Compartmented Information (“SCI”) categories.
Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance and additional SCI permissions could
have authorized access to such classified national security information.
3. Classified information, including SCI, was marked according to its classification
and applicable SCI compartments, following standard formats for different types of media,
including headers and footers stating the highest classification level and SCI compartments of
information a document contained and individual classifications markings for each paragraph.
4. Information classified at any level could only be lawfully accessed by persons
determined by an appropriate United States government official to be eligible for access to
classified information, who had signed an approved non-disclosure agreement, who received a
security clearance, and who had a “need to know” the classified information. Classified
information could only be stored in an approved facility and container.
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 2 of 7
3
Relevant Government Agencies
5. The U.S. Intelligence Community (“USIC”) consisted of U.S. executive branch
agencies and organizations that worked separately and together to conduct intelligence activities
necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States.
6. The FBI was a U.S. government law enforcement and intelligence agency with
various offices and facilities, and was a component of the USIC. The FBI’s headquarters was
located in Washington, D.C. The FBI’s mission was to protect the American people and uphold
the Constitution of the United States. Priorities of the FBI, among other things, included:
protecting the United States from terrorist attacks; protecting the United States against foreign
intelligence operations and espionage; and protecting the United States against cyber-based attacks
and high-technology crimes.
7. Another government agency (“OGA”) was a U.S. government intelligence agency
with various offices and facilities in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, and was a component
of the USIC. The OGA was responsible for, among other things, analysis, collection, foreign
intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities against urgent and important mission needs and
threats that were aligned with national intelligence priorities used to inform U.S. policy-makers;
and building a legacy of professional rapport of intelligence sharing with foreign partners
worldwide.
The Defendant’s Access to National Defense and Classified Information
8. Over her many years of FBI employment holding a TOP SECRET//SCI security
clearance, the defendant received training regarding classified information, including the
definitions of classified information, the levels of classification, and SCI, as well as the proper
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 3 of 7
4
handling, marking, transportation, and storage of classified materials. The defendant received
training on her duty to protect classified materials from unauthorized disclosure, which included
complying with handling, transportation, and storage requirements. The defendant knew that
unauthorized removal of classified materials and transportation and storage of those materials in
unauthorized locations risked disclosure and transmission of those materials, and therefore could
endanger the national security of the United States and the safety of its citizens. In particular, the
defendant was advised that unauthorized disclosure of SECRET information reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and that violation
of rules governing the handling of classified information could result in criminal prosecution.
The Defendant’s Removal and Retention of National Defense Information
9. Because the defendant held a security clearance, had received training regarding
the protection of classified information, and was employed by the FBI as an Intelligence Analyst,
the U.S. government entrusted the defendant with access to sensitive government materials,
including information relating to the national defense that was closely held by the U.S. government
(“National Defense Information”) and other classified documents and materials. The defendant
had access to these sensitive government materials at a secure area of the FBI’s Kansas City
Division and otherwise through secure government computer systems and programs.
10. Beginning at a time unknown, but no earlier than in or about June 2004, and
continuing through on or about December 15, 2017, the defendant improperly removed and
unlawfully and willfully retained, in her personal residence, sensitive government materials,
including National Defense Information and classified documents. The defendant was not
authorized to remove and retain these sensitive government materials, including the National
Defense Information and classified documents. Nor did the defendant have a “need to know”
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 4 of 7
5
most, if not all, of the information contained in those materials, including the National Defense
Information and classified documents. The defendant knew that she was not authorized to remove
and retain the materials, including the National Defense Information and classified documents.
The Charges
11. Paragraphs 1 through 10 of this Indictment are incorporated by reference and
realleged as if set forth fully herein.
COUNT ONE
12. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
in the Western District of Missouri, and elsewhere, KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant,
having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to the national
defense, did willfully retain the documents and failed to deliver them to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive them, to wit, the defendant without authorization retained
documents relating to the national defense at her personal residence, including the following:
Numerous documents classified at the SECRET level from the FBI that describe
intelligence sources and methods related to U.S. government efforts to defend against
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber threats. The documents include details on the
FBI’s nationwide objectives and priorities, including specific open investigations across multiple
field offices. In addition, there are documents relating to sensitive human source operations in
national security investigations, intelligence gaps regarding hostile foreign intelligence services
and terrorist organizations, and the technical capabilities of the FBI against counterintelligence
and counterterrorism targets. These documents include:
Doc. No. Description Classification Level
1 Feb. 2013 (approx.) presentation S//NF
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 5 of 7
6
2 Jan. 15, 2014 e-mail S//NF/FISA
3 Sep. 2014 (approx.) evaluation document S//NF
4 Jan. 22, 2014 intelligence note S//OC/NF/FISA
5 Mar. 2, 2009 intelligence bulletin S//OC/NF/FISA
6 Mar. 2010 (approx.) document S//OC/NF/FISA
7 Apr. 3, 2009 intelligence note S//OC/NF/FISA
8 Jul. 31, 2008 assessment S//NF
9 Dec. 29, 2014 intelligence note S//NF/FISA
10 Dec. 4, 2014 intelligence note S//NF
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).
COUNT TWO
13. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
in the Western District of Missouri, and elsewhere, KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant,
having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to the national
defense, did willfully retain the documents and failed to deliver them to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive them, to wit, the defendant without authorization retained
documents relating to the national defense at her personal residence, including the following:
Numerous documents classified at the SECRET level from the OGA that describe
intelligence sources and methods related to U.S. government efforts to collect intelligence on
terrorist groups. The documents include information about al Qaeda members on the African
continent, including a suspected associate of Usama bin Laden. In addition, there are documents
regarding the activities of emerging terrorists and their efforts to establish themselves in support
of al Qaeda in Africa. These documents include:
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 6 of 7
7
Doc. No. Description Classification Level
11 Mar. 8, 2006 internal correspondence containing SCI S//NF
12 Feb. 3, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
13 Nov. 29, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
14 Nov. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
15 Nov. 29, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
16 Nov. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
17 Jul. 7, 2005 internal correspondence S//NF
18 Mar. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
19 Dec. 21, 2006 memo to FBI S//NF
20 Nov. 22, 2006 internal correspondence containing SCI S//NF
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).
A TRUE BILL.
5/18/2021 /s/ Pamela Carter-Smith
DATE FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY
/s/ Patrick C. Edwards
Patrick C. Edwards
David Raskin
Assistant United States Attorneys
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 7 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CRIMINAL CASE COVER SHEET
Division of Filing
Western
Central
Southwestern
St. Joseph
Southern
Place of Offense
Jackson
County and
elsewhere
Matter to be Sealed
Secret Indictment
Juvenile
Defendant Information
Defendant Name Kendra Kingsbury
Alias Name N/A
Birthdate 10/4/1972
Related Case Information
Superseding Indictment/Information Yes No if yes, original case number
New Defendant Yes No
Prior Complaint Case Number, if any N/A
Prior Target Letter Case Number, if any N/A
U.S. Attorney Information
AUSA Patrick Edwards & David Raskin
Interpreter Needed
Yes Language and/or dialect
No
Location Status
Arrest Date
Currently in Federal Custody
Currently in State Custody Writ Required Yes No
Currently on Bond Warrant Required Yes No
U.S.C. Citations
Total # of Counts 2
Set Index Key/Code/Offense Level Description of Offense Charged Count(s)
1 18:793.F/9752/4 Willful Retention of National
Defense Information 1, 2
2
3
4
(May be continued on reverse)
Date 5/18/2021 Signature of AUSA /s/ Patrick Edwards
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1-1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 1 of 1
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENDRA KINGSBURY,
[DOB: 10/4/1972]
Defendant.
Case No. __________________________
COUNTS ONE AND TWO:
Willful Retention of National Defense
Information
18 U.S.C. § 793(e)
NMT: 10 years’ imprisonment
NMT: $250,000 fine
NMT: 3 years’ supervised release
Class C felony
$100 mandatory special assessment per count
I N D I C T M E N T
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:
At all times relevant to this Indictment:
General Allegations
1. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant, was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), Kansas City Division, in the position of Intelligence Analyst. In her position as
Intelligence Analyst, the defendant was assigned to a sequence of different FBI “squads,” each of
which had a particular focus, such as, illegal drug trafficking, violent crime, violent gangs, and
counterintelligence. In connection with her FBI employment, and in furtherance of her duties as
an Intelligence Analyst, the defendant held a TOP SECRET//SCI security clearance and had
access to national defense and classified information.
Classified Information
2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as amended by
Executive Order 13292 on March 25, 2003, and Executive Order 13526 on December 29, 2009,
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 1 of 7
2
national security information was classified as “TOP SECRET,” “SECRET,” or
“CONFIDENTIAL.” National security information was information owned by, produced by,
produced for, and under the control of the United States government that was classified as
follows:
A. Information was classified as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure
of that information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security that the original classification authority was able to identify and
describe.
B. Information was classified as SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of
that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security that the original classification authority was able to identify and describe.
C. Information was classified as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized
disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security that the original classification authority was able to identify and
describe.
2. Access to national security information classified at any level could be further
restricted through compartmentation in Sensitive Compartmented Information (“SCI”) categories.
Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance and additional SCI permissions could
have authorized access to such classified national security information.
3. Classified information, including SCI, was marked according to its classification
and applicable SCI compartments, following standard formats for different types of media,
including headers and footers stating the highest classification level and SCI compartments of
information a document contained and individual classifications markings for each paragraph.
4. Information classified at any level could only be lawfully accessed by persons
determined by an appropriate United States government official to be eligible for access to
classified information, who had signed an approved non-disclosure agreement, who received a
security clearance, and who had a “need to know” the classified information. Classified
information could only be stored in an approved facility and container.
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 2 of 7
3
Relevant Government Agencies
5. The U.S. Intelligence Community (“USIC”) consisted of U.S. executive branch
agencies and organizations that worked separately and together to conduct intelligence activities
necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States.
6. The FBI was a U.S. government law enforcement and intelligence agency with
various offices and facilities, and was a component of the USIC. The FBI’s headquarters was
located in Washington, D.C. The FBI’s mission was to protect the American people and uphold
the Constitution of the United States. Priorities of the FBI, among other things, included:
protecting the United States from terrorist attacks; protecting the United States against foreign
intelligence operations and espionage; and protecting the United States against cyber-based attacks
and high-technology crimes.
7. Another government agency (“OGA”) was a U.S. government intelligence agency
with various offices and facilities in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, and was a component
of the USIC. The OGA was responsible for, among other things, analysis, collection, foreign
intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities against urgent and important mission needs and
threats that were aligned with national intelligence priorities used to inform U.S. policy-makers;
and building a legacy of professional rapport of intelligence sharing with foreign partners
worldwide.
The Defendant’s Access to National Defense and Classified Information
8. Over her many years of FBI employment holding a TOP SECRET//SCI security
clearance, the defendant received training regarding classified information, including the
definitions of classified information, the levels of classification, and SCI, as well as the proper
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 3 of 7
4
handling, marking, transportation, and storage of classified materials. The defendant received
training on her duty to protect classified materials from unauthorized disclosure, which included
complying with handling, transportation, and storage requirements. The defendant knew that
unauthorized removal of classified materials and transportation and storage of those materials in
unauthorized locations risked disclosure and transmission of those materials, and therefore could
endanger the national security of the United States and the safety of its citizens. In particular, the
defendant was advised that unauthorized disclosure of SECRET information reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and that violation
of rules governing the handling of classified information could result in criminal prosecution.
The Defendant’s Removal and Retention of National Defense Information
9. Because the defendant held a security clearance, had received training regarding
the protection of classified information, and was employed by the FBI as an Intelligence Analyst,
the U.S. government entrusted the defendant with access to sensitive government materials,
including information relating to the national defense that was closely held by the U.S. government
(“National Defense Information”) and other classified documents and materials. The defendant
had access to these sensitive government materials at a secure area of the FBI’s Kansas City
Division and otherwise through secure government computer systems and programs.
10. Beginning at a time unknown, but no earlier than in or about June 2004, and
continuing through on or about December 15, 2017, the defendant improperly removed and
unlawfully and willfully retained, in her personal residence, sensitive government materials,
including National Defense Information and classified documents. The defendant was not
authorized to remove and retain these sensitive government materials, including the National
Defense Information and classified documents. Nor did the defendant have a “need to know”
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 4 of 7
5
most, if not all, of the information contained in those materials, including the National Defense
Information and classified documents. The defendant knew that she was not authorized to remove
and retain the materials, including the National Defense Information and classified documents.
The Charges
11. Paragraphs 1 through 10 of this Indictment are incorporated by reference and
realleged as if set forth fully herein.
COUNT ONE
12. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
in the Western District of Missouri, and elsewhere, KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant,
having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to the national
defense, did willfully retain the documents and failed to deliver them to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive them, to wit, the defendant without authorization retained
documents relating to the national defense at her personal residence, including the following:
Numerous documents classified at the SECRET level from the FBI that describe
intelligence sources and methods related to U.S. government efforts to defend against
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber threats. The documents include details on the
FBI’s nationwide objectives and priorities, including specific open investigations across multiple
field offices. In addition, there are documents relating to sensitive human source operations in
national security investigations, intelligence gaps regarding hostile foreign intelligence services
and terrorist organizations, and the technical capabilities of the FBI against counterintelligence
and counterterrorism targets. These documents include:
Doc. No. Description Classification Level
1 Feb. 2013 (approx.) presentation S//NF
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 5 of 7
6
2 Jan. 15, 2014 e-mail S//NF/FISA
3 Sep. 2014 (approx.) evaluation document S//NF
4 Jan. 22, 2014 intelligence note S//OC/NF/FISA
5 Mar. 2, 2009 intelligence bulletin S//OC/NF/FISA
6 Mar. 2010 (approx.) document S//OC/NF/FISA
7 Apr. 3, 2009 intelligence note S//OC/NF/FISA
8 Jul. 31, 2008 assessment S//NF
9 Dec. 29, 2014 intelligence note S//NF/FISA
10 Dec. 4, 2014 intelligence note S//NF
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).
COUNT TWO
13. From in or about June 2004, up to and including on or about December 15, 2017,
in the Western District of Missouri, and elsewhere, KENDRA KINGSBURY, the defendant,
having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to the national
defense, did willfully retain the documents and failed to deliver them to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive them, to wit, the defendant without authorization retained
documents relating to the national defense at her personal residence, including the following:
Numerous documents classified at the SECRET level from the OGA that describe
intelligence sources and methods related to U.S. government efforts to collect intelligence on
terrorist groups. The documents include information about al Qaeda members on the African
continent, including a suspected associate of Usama bin Laden. In addition, there are documents
regarding the activities of emerging terrorists and their efforts to establish themselves in support
of al Qaeda in Africa. These documents include:
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 6 of 7
7
Doc. No. Description Classification Level
11 Mar. 8, 2006 internal correspondence containing SCI S//NF
12 Feb. 3, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
13 Nov. 29, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
14 Nov. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
15 Nov. 29, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
16 Nov. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
17 Jul. 7, 2005 internal correspondence S//NF
18 Mar. 24, 2006 internal correspondence S//NF
19 Dec. 21, 2006 memo to FBI S//NF
20 Nov. 22, 2006 internal correspondence containing SCI S//NF
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).
A TRUE BILL.
5/18/2021 /s/ Pamela Carter-Smith
DATE FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY
/s/ Patrick C. Edwards
Patrick C. Edwards
David Raskin
Assistant United States Attorneys
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 7 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CRIMINAL CASE COVER SHEET
Division of Filing
Western
Central
Southwestern
St. Joseph
Southern
Place of Offense
Jackson
County and
elsewhere
Matter to be Sealed
Secret Indictment
Juvenile
Defendant Information
Defendant Name Kendra Kingsbury
Alias Name N/A
Birthdate 10/4/1972
Related Case Information
Superseding Indictment/Information Yes No if yes, original case number
New Defendant Yes No
Prior Complaint Case Number, if any N/A
Prior Target Letter Case Number, if any N/A
U.S. Attorney Information
AUSA Patrick Edwards & David Raskin
Interpreter Needed
Yes Language and/or dialect
No
Location Status
Arrest Date
Currently in Federal Custody
Currently in State Custody Writ Required Yes No
Currently on Bond Warrant Required Yes No
U.S.C. Citations
Total # of Counts 2
Set Index Key/Code/Offense Level Description of Offense Charged Count(s)
1 18:793.F/9752/4 Willful Retention of National
Defense Information 1, 2
2
3
4
(May be continued on reverse)
Date 5/18/2021 Signature of AUSA /s/ Patrick Edwards
Case 4:21-cr-00101-SRB Document 1-1 Filed 05/18/21 Page 1 of 1
