UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JON CHANG HYOK,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
January 2020 Grand Jury
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JON CHANG HYOK,
aka “Quan Jiang,”
aka “Alex Jiang,”
KIM IL,
aka “Julien Kim,”
aka “Tony Walker,” and
PARK JIN HYOK,
aka “Jin Hyok Park,”
aka “Pak Jin Hek,”
aka “Pak Kwang Jin,”
Defendants.
CR
I N D I C T M E N T
[18 U.S.C. § 371: Conspiracy; 18
U.S.C. § 1349: Conspiracy to
Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud;
18 U.S.C. §§ 982, 1030: Criminal
Forfeiture]
The Grand Jury charges:
INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
At times relevant to this Indictment:
A. The Conspiracy and Defendants
1. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”), also
known as (“aka”) North Korea, operated a military intelligence agency
called the Reconnaissance General Bureau (“RGB”). The RGB was
headquartered in Pyongyang, DPRK, and comprised multiple units.
2:20-cr-00614-DMG
12/8/2020
JB
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2. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK (ࢷ ,(ୂॷaka “Quan Jiang,” aka
“Alex Jiang”; KIM IL (̡ࢊ ,(aka “Julien Kim,” aka “Tony Walker”; and
PARK JIN HYOK (ऑୂ), aka “Jin Hyok Park,” aka “Pak Jin Hek,” aka
“Pak Kwang Jin” (collectively, the “defendants”), whose photographs
are attached as Exhibit A through Exhibit C, respectively, were
members of units of the RGB who knowingly and intentionally conspired
with each other, and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury
(collectively, with the defendants, referred to as the “conspirators”
and the “hackers”), to conduct criminal cyber intrusions.
3. The defendants and other conspirators resided in the DPRK,
but, at times during the operation of the conspiracy, traveled to and
worked from other countries -- including the People’s Republic of
China and the Russian Federation -- while employed by units of the
RGB. The conspirators included members of units of the RGB that have
come to be known within the cyber-security community as both Lazarus
Group and Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (“APT38”).
4. The conspirators hacked into the computers of victims to
cause damage, steal data and money, and otherwise further the
strategic and financial interests of the DPRK government and its
leader, Kim Jong Un (the “DPRK regime”). In some instances, the
hackers sought to cause damage through computer intrusions in
response to perceived reputational harm or to obtain information
furthering strategic interests of the DPRK regime. In many
instances, the hackers intended the computer intrusions to steal
currency and virtual currency (also known as “cryptocurrency”), or to
obtain it through extortion, for the benefit of the DPRK regime --
and, at times, for their own private financial gain. The hackers
attempted to steal or extort more than $1.3 billion from victims in
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cyber-enabled heists and Automated Teller Machine (“ATM”) cash-outs
from banks, cyber-enabled heists from cryptocurrency companies, and
cyber-enabled extortion schemes.
5. The hackers’ victims and intended victims included
entertainment companies, financial institutions, cryptocurrency
companies (including cryptocurrency exchanges, traders, and
marketplaces), online casinos, cleared defense contractors, energy
utilities, and individuals. The hackers hacked and defrauded victims
around the world -- including in Bangladesh, Malta, Mexico,
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea,
Slovenia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Central America, and
Africa -- as well as in the United States and, specifically, the
Central District of California. The hackers targeted victims in
numerous other countries, as well, and used infrastructure and online
accounts from around the world in furtherance of the computer
intrusions, including infrastructure located in the Central District
of California.
6. The computer intrusions often started with fraudulent,
spear-phishing messages -- emails and other electronic communications
designed to make intended victims download and execute malicious
software (“malware”) developed by the hackers. At other times, the
spear-phishing messages would encourage intended victims to download
or invest in a cryptocurrency-related software program created by the
hackers, which covertly contained malicious code and/or would
subsequently be updated with malicious code after the program was
downloaded (a “malicious cryptocurrency application”). To hone the
spear-phishing messages, the hackers would conduct internet research
regarding their intended victims and would send “test” spear-phishing
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messages to each other or themselves. The hackers employed false and
fraudulent personas when they sent spear-phishing messages to
victims.
7. Once they gained access to a victim computer system, the
hackers would conduct research within the system, attempt to move
laterally within a computer network, and attempt to locate and
exfiltrate sensitive and confidential information. In both revengeand financially-motivated computer attacks, the hackers would, at
times, execute commands to destroy computer systems, deploy
ransomware, or otherwise render the computers of their victims
inoperable.
8. The hackers took steps to avoid detection and attribution
of their computer intrusions to themselves, the RGB, and the DPRK.
However, the computer infrastructure and online accounts used in the
computer intrusions, and technical similarities in the malware
employed, connected these computer intrusions with the hackers,
showing that (a) the defendants and other hackers were conspiring
with one another, (b) they were members of the RGB, and (c) the
computer intrusions were part of a single hacking conspiracy.
B. The Hackers’ Targets
Entertainment Companies
9. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. (“Sony Pictures”) was an
American entertainment company, headquartered in Culver City,
California, that produced and distributed filmed entertainment,
including the movie “The Interview,” which depicted the fictionalized
assassination of Kim Jong Un, whom it parodied. Sony Pictures
maintained computer systems, including servers hosting employee data
and servers hosting intellectual property, in Los Angeles County,
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within the Central District of California, that operated in
interstate and foreign commerce.
10. AMC Theatres was an American movie theater chain
headquartered in Leawood, Kansas, which was set to show “The
Interview” in its theaters prior to the cyber-attack on Sony
Pictures.
11. Mammoth Screen was a United Kingdom television production
company that was producing “Opposite Number,” a ten-part fictional
series about a British nuclear scientist on a covert mission who was
taken prisoner in the DPRK.
Financial Institutions and Financial Regulators
12. The “African Bank” was a bank headquartered in a country in
Africa.
13. Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, was
headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
14. Banco Nacional De Comercio Exterior, which is also known as
“Bancomext,” was a Mexican state-owned bank headquartered in Mexico
City, Mexico.
15. The “Maltese Bank” was a bank headquartered in Malta.
16. BankIslami Pakistan Limited, which is also known as
“BankIslami,” was a bank headquartered in Karachi, Pakistan.
17. The “New York Financial Services Company” was a financial
services company headquartered in New York, New York.
18. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority was the
financial regulatory authority for Poland, and was based in Warsaw,
Poland.
19. The “Philippine Bank” was a bank headquartered in Makati,
Philippines.
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20. Far Eastern International Bank was a bank headquartered in
Taipei, Taiwan.
21. The “Vietnamese Bank” was a bank headquartered in Hanoi,
Vietnam.
Cryptocurrency Companies
22. The “Indonesian Cryptocurrency Company” was a
cryptocurrency exchange based in Jakarta, Indonesia.
23. The “South Korean Cryptocurrency Company” was a
cryptocurrency exchange based in the Republic of Korea.
24. The “Slovenian Cryptocurrency Company” was a crypto-mining
company headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Online Casino Companies
25. “Central American Online Casino 1” was an online casino
business headquartered in a Central American country.
26. “Central American Online Casino 2” was an online casino
business headquartered in a Central American country.
C. Definitions
27. An Internet Protocol version 4 address, also known as an
“IPv4 address,” or more commonly an “IP address,” is a set of four
numbers or “octets,” each ranging from 0 to 255 and separated by a
period (“.”) that is used to route traffic on the internet. A single
IP address can manage internet traffic for more than one computer or
device, such as in a workspace or when a router in one’s home routes
traffic to one’s desktop computer, as well as one’s tablet or
smartphone, while all using the same IP address to access the
internet.
28. “Malware” is malicious computer software intended to cause
a victim computer to behave in a manner inconsistent with the
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intention of the owner or user of the victim computer, usually
unbeknownst to that person. The hackers developed and used numerous
types of malware, including worms, ransomware, credential-stealers,
key-loggers, screen-grabbers, and backdoors.
29. “Brambul” is a type of “worm” malware that spreads through
self-replication by infecting new victim systems via brute force
attacks on the victim’s Server Message Block (“SMB”) protocol. SMB
is a method that Microsoft systems use to share files on a network.
A brute force attack is a computer network attack that attempts to
login to a potential victim computer, server, or account using a
predetermined list of possible username and password combinations,
which lists often contain thousands of common combinations of
usernames and passwords that include specific default settings used
on certain applications and devices. Upon successfully gaining
access to a victim computer, Brambul conducts a survey of the victim
machine and collects information, including the victim’s IP address,
system name, operating system, username last logged in, and last
password used. Brambul then sends that information via Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol to one or more of the email addresses (“Brambul
collector accounts”) that are hard-coded in Brambul.
30. “Ransomware” is a type of malware that infects a computer
and encrypts some or all of the data or files on the computer, and
then demands that the victim pay a ransom in order to decrypt and
recover the files, or in order to prevent the hacker from
distributing or destroying the data.
31. A “watering hole” is a type of computer intrusion technique
in which a hacker uses malware to compromise a website known to be
visited by intended victims. The malware then infects the computers
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of intended victims (and sometimes unintended victims) who visit the
website, giving the hacker access to the victims’ computers and
networks.
32. “Command and control” IP addresses or domains -- sometimes
referred to as “C2s” -- are computers with which malware communicates
to send and receive data and commands.
33. A “spear-phishing” message is a tailored and personalized
email or other electronic communication designed to appear legitimate
in order to induce the targeted recipient(s) to take a certain action
-- such as clicking on a link, or downloading or opening a file --
that would cause a victim’s computer to be compromised by a hacker.
Spear-phishing messages often include information that the hacker
knows about the recipient(s) based on research or other sources of
information about the intended victim.
34. “Cryptocurrency” or “virtual currency” is a digital asset
designed to work as a medium of exchange that uses cryptography to
secure financial transactions, control the creation of additional
units of the currency, and verify and transfer assets.
Cryptocurrency is typically accessed using secret or private
encryption “keys” which are commonly stored using a software
“wallet.” Cryptocurrency “exchanges” are clearinghouses that allow
for the exchange between different types of cryptocurrencies, or
between cryptocurrency and fiat currency. “Crypto-mining” is a means
of generating new units of cryptocurrency.
35. An “initial coin offering” or “ICO” is the cryptocurrency
equivalent of a stock’s Initial Public Offering or “IPO” -- that is,
a cryptocurrency developer’s first offer to sell a stake in a
cryptocurrency to the public.
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COUNT ONE
[18 U.S.C. § 371]
36. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1
through 35 of the Introductory Allegations and Definitions of this
Indictment.
A. OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
37. Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later
than September 28, 2009, and continuing through at least December 8,
2020, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of
California, and elsewhere, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and
PARK JIN HYOK, together with others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury, knowingly conspired:
a. to intentionally access computers without
authorization and obtain information from protected computers, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(2)(C),
(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii);
b. to knowingly and with intent to defraud access
protected computers without authorization, and by means of such
conduct further the intended fraud and obtain a thing of value, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(4),
(c)(3)(A);
c. to knowingly cause the transmission of programs,
information, codes, and commands, and as a result of such conduct
intentionally cause damage without authorization to protected
computers, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I),
(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI); and
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d. to transmit in interstate and foreign commerce, with
the intent to extort money and other things of value, a communication
containing (i) a threat to cause damage to a protected computer,
(ii) a threat to impair the confidentiality of information obtained
from a protected computer without authorization, and (iii) a demand
and request for money and other things of value in relation to damage
to a protected computer, where such damage was caused to facilitate
the extortion, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1030(a)(7)(A)–(C), (c)(3)(A).
B. MEANS BY WHICH THE OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY WERE TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED
38. The objects of the conspiracy were to be accomplished, in
substance, as follows:
Development and Dissemination of Malware
a. The hackers would develop malware that could be
transmitted to potential victims in order to gain unauthorized access
to the computer(s) of the victims. Such malware would include the
Brambul worm, ransomware, and other types of malware.
b. At times, the hackers would conceal the malware within
seemingly legitimate word processing documents or software
applications, including programs related to cryptocurrency trading
(i.e., malicious cryptocurrency applications), which the hackers
would falsely and fraudulently, and through the omission of material
facts, market as being legitimate software applications. Malicious
cryptocurrency applications would contain, or would through a
subsequent software update process be updated to contain, malicious
code that would provide the hackers with unauthorized access to the
computers of persons who downloaded the applications.
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c. At other times, the hackers would conceal the malware
within legitimate websites in order to infect victims visiting the
websites (i.e., a watering hole).
d. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, PARK JIN HYOK, and
other conspirators, would register and use email and social media
accounts in false and fraudulent names -- including the names of real
persons -- to use in gaining unauthorized access to victim computers,
including to contact potential victims, send spear-phishing messages,
register other accounts used by the hackers, and/or serve as Brambul
collector accounts.
e. Hackers would use the internet to research potential
victims with whom they would attempt to communicate.
f. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and other
conspirators, would communicate with potential victims using false
and fraudulent names, sending spear-phishing messages or electronic
messages designed to establish a relationship with the intended
victim before sending a later spear-phishing message. The hackers
would communicate with individuals in a variety of sectors, including
entertainment companies, financial institutions, hundreds of
cryptocurrency companies, online casinos, cleared defense
contractors, energy utilities, technology companies, and government
agencies.
g. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and other
conspirators, would send misleading and fraudulent communications to
potential victims containing malware or directing the potential
victims to download malware, including malicious cryptocurrency
applications, ransomware, and other malware.
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h. At times, to carry out computer intrusions or
attempted intrusions, hackers would use or access computer
infrastructure that they had compromised through the Brambul worm or
a watering hole.
Destructive Cyberattacks, and Attempted Cyberattacks,
on Entertainment Companies
i. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim entertainment company, the hackers would use the
malware to access the computer(s) without authorization and install
other malware.
j. The hackers would then access the computer(s) of the
victim entertainment company without authorization and attempt to
access other computer systems connected to the computer(s) to steal
confidential credentials, files, data, unreleased movies, and other
information that could be damaging or embarrassing to the
entertainment company.
k. The hackers would then install destructive malware on
the victim entertainment company’s computers, which malware could be
used to destroy or impair the computers and render them inoperable,
and to conceal forensic evidence of the hackers’ unauthorized access.
l. After successfully installing destructive malware on
computers of the victim entertainment company, the hackers would, at
a later date, make threatening communications to the victim
entertainment company using false and fraudulent personas, publicly
disseminate the victim entertainment company’s confidential internal
information, and activate destructive capabilities of the malware the
hackers previously installed in order to destroy or impair the victim
entertainment company’s computers and render them inoperable.
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Bank Cyber-Enabled Heists
m. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim bank, the hackers would use the malware to access the
computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
n. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
bank without authorization and attempt to move through the bank’s
network in order to access one or more computers that the victim bank
used to send or receive messages through the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) communication system.
o. The hackers would develop and deploy malware
customized to the computer network of the victim bank, in order to
send fraudulent SWIFT messages from the victim bank’s computer
system, authorizing fraudulent wire transfers to bank accounts used
and controlled by the hackers, including accounts at United States
federally insured financial institutions.
p. The hackers also would develop and deploy destructive
malware to conceal their point of access to the victim bank’s
computer network, their path through the victim bank’s computer
network, and the fraudulent wire transfers.
q. At times, the hackers would install, on the
computer(s), malware designed to destroy, impair, or render
inoperable the victim bank’s computer network or computers within the
network, and to conceal forensic evidence of the hackers’
unauthorized access to the computer(s).
Cyber-Enabled Extortions
r. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended extortion victim, the hackers would use the malware to
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access the computer(s) without authorization and install other
malware.
s. The hackers would then access the computer(s) of the
extortion victim without authorization and attempt to access other
computer systems connected to the computer(s) to steal confidential
credentials, files, data, and other information that could be
damaging or embarrassing to the extortion victim.
t. At times, the hackers would install ransomware on the
computer(s) of the extortion victim in order to render the
computer(s) inaccessible and inoperable.
u. The hackers would then communicate with the extortion
victim, demanding a payment in a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, in
exchange for not publicly releasing the extortion victim’s files that
had been stolen or unencrypting any computers infected by ransomware.
v. The hackers would, at times, offer to tell the
extortion victim how the hackers had accessed the extortion victim’s
computer(s) if additional ransom payments were made.
w. If the extortion victim did not pay the hackers’
ransom demands, the hackers would threaten to -- and would in fact --
publicly disseminate confidential information stolen from the
computer(s) of the extortion victim, destroy the information and not
return a copy, or leave the computer(s) of the victim encrypted with
ransomware.
Cryptocurrency Heists
x. After malware, such as a malicious cryptocurrency
application, was installed on the computer(s) of an intended victim
cryptocurrency company, the hackers would use the malware to access
the computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
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y. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
cryptocurrency company without authorization and attempt to move
through the victim cryptocurrency company’s computer network in order
to access a computer that would provide access to the victim
cryptocurrency company’s cryptocurrency wallet(s) and private keys to
the wallet.
z. Once they had access to the wallet(s) and private keys
of the victim cryptocurrency company, the hackers would fraudulently
and without authorization transfer cryptocurrency from those wallets
to wallets used and controlled by the hackers.
ATM Cash-Outs
aa. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim bank, the hackers would use the malware to access the
computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
bb. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
bank without authorization and attempt to move through the victim
bank’s computer network in order to access one or more computers that
the victim bank used to manage ATM transactions.
cc. The hackers would develop and deploy malware
customized to the computer network of the victim bank, in order to
intercept ATM transaction data and cause fraudulent ATM withdrawal
requests to be approved, which would cause a requesting ATM to
dispense cash to money-launderer coconspirators.
dd. The hackers also developed and deployed malware to
conceal their point of access to the victim bank’s computer network,
their path through the victim bank’s computer network, and the
fraudulent ATM withdrawal requests.
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C. OVERT ACTS
39. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its
objects, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and PARK JIN HYOK,
together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, on or about
the dates set forth below, committed and caused to be committed
various overt acts, in the Central District of California and
elsewhere, including, but not limited to, the following:
Destructive Cyberattacks, and Attempted Cyberattacks,
on Entertainment Companies
Overt Act No. 1: Beginning on November 24, 2014, after
sending threatening communications to Sony Pictures employees, the
hackers initiated a destructive cyber-attack of Sony Pictures
computers, publicly disseminated Sony Pictures’ confidential data and
communications stolen from its computers, and made further threats
against the company and its employees.
Overt Act No. 2: On December 2 and 3, 2014, the hackers sent
spear-phishing messages to AMC Theatres employees from multiple email
accounts.
Overt Act No. 3: At an unknown date in 2015, the hackers
gained unauthorized access to the computers of Mammoth Screen.
Cyber-Enabled Heists from, and Intrusions of, Banks
Overt Act No. 4: Beginning in or around November 2015, the
hackers gained unauthorized access to the Philippine Bank’s computer
network, but did not succeed in making fraudulent wire transfers
before the unauthorized access was detected and mitigated.
Overt Act No. 5: On December 9, 2015, having gained
unauthorized access to the Vietnamese Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire
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transfers totaling approximately €2 million to bank accounts in
Slovenia and Bulgaria, and attempted to conduct fraudulent wire
transfers of approximately $3.4 million to Russia, A$1 million to
Australia, and g90 million to Japan.
Overt Act No. 6: On February 4, 2016, having gained
unauthorized access to Bangladesh Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers attempted to conduct false and fraudulent
wire transfers totaling approximately $951 million, and conducted
false and fraudulent wire transfers totaling approximately
$81 million to bank accounts in the Philippines and $20 million to a
bank account in Sri Lanka, which moneys all belonged to Bangladesh
Bank and were held in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
Overt Act No. 7: On July 20, 2016, having gained unauthorized
access to the African Bank’s computer network at an earlier date, the
hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire transfers totaling
approximately $104.1 million to bank accounts in Taiwan, Thailand,
and Cambodia.
Overt Act No. 8: Beginning in or around October 2016, the
hackers gained unauthorized access to the computer network of the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority and made its website into a
watering hole.
Overt Act No. 9: On October 3, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to Far Eastern International Bank’s computer
network at an earlier date, the hackers conducted false and
fraudulent wire transfers totaling approximately $60.1 million to
bank accounts in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and the United States.
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Overt Act No. 10: On January 9, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to Bancomext’s computer network at an earlier
date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire transfers
totaling approximately $110 million to bank accounts in the Republic
of Korea, and then deployed malware on more than 400 of Bancomext’s
computers.
Overt Act No. 11: In January and February 2019, defendant KIM
IL or another hacker communicated with unindicted coconspirator
Ghaleb Alaumary regarding bank accounts that could receive false and
fraudulent wire transfers from the Maltese Bank.
Overt Act No. 12: On February 12, 2019, having gained
unauthorized access to the Maltese Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire
transfers totaling approximately $6.4 million and €7.1 million to
bank accounts in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the Czech Republic.
Cyber-Enabled Extortions and Ransomware
Overt Act No. 13: On or before May 12, 2017, the hackers
authored the ransomware used in a global, destructive cyber-attack
known publicly as WannaCry Version 2.
Overt Act No. 14: On June 29, 2017, having gained unauthorized
access to a computer system at an earlier date and stolen
confidential customer information of the South Korean Cryptocurrency
Company, the hackers publicly released that information after the
South Korean Cryptocurrency Company refused to pay a ransom of
approximately $16 million in cryptocurrency.
Overt Act No. 15: On August 24, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to a computer system of a victim company at an
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earlier date, the hackers deployed ransomware on the computer system
and then extorted payments totaling approximately $100,000 in
cryptocurrency from the victim.
Overt Act No. 16: On October 13, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of Central American
Online Casino 1 at an earlier date and stolen its confidential
customer information, the hackers extorted payments totaling
approximately $2.3 million in cryptocurrency from Central American
Online Casino 1.
Overt Act No. 17: On November 2, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of Central American
Online Casino 2 at an earlier date and stolen its confidential
customer information, the hackers extorted payments totaling
approximately $361,500 in cryptocurrency from Central American Online
Casino 2.
Malicious Cryptocurrency Applications
Overt Act No. 18: Beginning in March 2018, defendant JON CHANG
HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications, including
spear-phishing messages, to numerous employees of cryptocurrency
exchanges.
Overt Act No. 19: Beginning on or before May 15, 2018,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Celas Trade Pro,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 20: Beginning on June 18, 2018, defendant JON
CHANG HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications
advertising Celas Trade Pro to numerous employees of cryptocurrency
exchanges.
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Overt Act No. 21: Beginning on or before October 11, 2018,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed WorldBit-Bot,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 22: Beginning on November 14, 2018, defendant
JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications
advertising WorldBit-Bot to employees of cryptocurrency exchanges.
Overt Act No. 23: Beginning on or before March 6, 2019, the
hackers developed iCryptoFx, which was purportedly a “Cryptocurrency
Algo-Trading Tool,” but which was, in reality, a malicious
cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 24: Beginning on April 27, 2019, defendant KIM
IL or another hacker created online accounts using false and
fraudulent personas for purported employees of iCryptoFx, which were
designed to make iCryptoFx appear to be a legitimate cryptocurrency
program.
Overt Act No. 25: Beginning on or before June 4, 2019,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Union Crypto
Trader, which was purportedly a cryptocurrency trading software, but
which was, in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 26: On dates in April 2019 through July 2019,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers created online accounts
using false and fraudulent personas for purported employees of Union
Crypto Trader, which were designed to make Union Crypto Trader appear
to be legitimate.
Overt Act No. 27: Beginning on or before February 21, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Kupay Wallet,
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which was purportedly cryptocurrency wallet software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 28: Beginning on or before February 28, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed CoinGo Trade,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 29: In early March 2020, defendant JON CHANG
HYOK or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of Kupay Wallet.
Overt Act No. 30: In late March 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of CoinGo Trade.
Overt Act No. 31: Beginning on or before March 30, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Dorusio, which
was purportedly cryptocurrency wallet software, but which was, in
reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 32: On March 30, 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of Dorusio.
Overt Act No. 33: Beginning on or before May 6, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed CryptoNeuro
Trader, which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but
which was, in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 34: In late July 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of CryptoNeuro Trader.
Overt Act No. 35: Beginning on or before September 1, 2020, a
conspirator or conspirators developed Ants2Whale, which was
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purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was, in
reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Cryptocurrency Heists
Overt Act No. 36: On December 4, 2017, a conspirator sent a
spear-phishing communication to an employee of the Slovenian
Cryptocurrency Company, which included a hyperlink that redirected
the employee to download a file containing malware.
Overt Act No. 37: On December 15, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the Slovenian
Cryptocurrency Company at an earlier date, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $75 million, from
the wallets of the Slovenian Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 38: In March 2018 and April 2018, a conspirator
sent spear-phishing communications to employees of the Indonesian
Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 39: On September 27, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the Indonesian
Cryptocurrency Company at an earlier date, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $24.9 million,
from the wallets of the Indonesian Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 40: On August 7, 2020, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the New York Financial
Services Company at an earlier date by using the CryptoNeuro Trader
malicious cryptocurrency application, and using that unauthorized
access to steal data that they would later use to attempt to extort
the New York Financial Services Company, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $11.8 million,
from the wallets of the New York Financial Services Company.
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ATM Cash-Outs
Overt Act No. 41: On October 27, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of BankIslami, the
hackers caused fraudulent ATM withdrawal requests to be approved,
which caused requesting ATMs to dispense approximately $6.1 million
to money-launderer coconspirators, including coconspirators acting at
the direction of unindicted coconspirator Ghaleb Alaumary.
Additional Spear-Phishing Campaigns
Overt Act No. 42: Beginning in March 2016 and continuing
through August 2016, conspirators sent numerous spear-phishing
communications to employees of United States cleared defense
contractors, energy companies, and aerospace companies.
Overt Act No. 43: Beginning in February 2017 and continuing
through May 2017, conspirators sent numerous spear-phishing
communications to United States cleared defense contractors.
Overt Act No. 44: In November 2019, conspirators sent spearphishing communications to the employees of the United States
Department of State.
Overt Act No. 45: In January and February 2020, conspirators
sent numerous spear-phishing communications to employees of the
United States Department of State, the United States Department of
Defense, and multiple United States technology companies.
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COUNT TWO
[18 U.S.C. § 1349]
40. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1
through 35 of the Introductory Allegations and Definitions of this
Indictment.
A. OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
41. Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later
than September 28, 2009, and continuing through at least December 8,
2020, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of
California, and elsewhere, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and
PARK JIN HYOK, together with others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury, knowingly conspired to commit the following offenses:
a. wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1343; and
b. bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1344(2).
B. THE MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
42. The objects of the conspiracy were to be accomplished, in
substance, as follows:
a. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs
38.a through 38.dd of Section B of Count One of this Indictment.
Marine Chain
b. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would develop
a plan to create a digital token called “Marine Chain Token,” which
would allow investors to purchase fractional ownership interests in
marine shipping vessels, such as cargo ships, supported by a
blockchain.
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c. Defendant KIM IL would contact individuals in
Singapore, whom defendant KIM IL knew from when he previously lived
in Singapore, regarding potential involvement in creating Marine
Chain.
d. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would, at
other times, use false and fraudulent names when contacting
individuals who they hoped would be involved in creating Marine
Chain. In those instances, defendant KIM IL and other conspirators
would not disclose to these individuals that the conspirators were
DPRK citizens or that they were communicating using false and
fraudulent names.
e. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would raise
funds for the Marine Chain platform through an ICO, which would, in
part, entail communicating with potential investors using false and
fraudulent names in order to convince them to invest in the Marine
Chain platform. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would not
disclose to these individuals that the conspirators were DPRK
citizens or that they were communicating using false and fraudulent
names. They also would not disclose to investors that a purpose of
the Marine Chain Token was to evade United States sanctions on North
Korea.
f. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would attempt
to receive approval from the Securities and Futures Commission of
Hong Kong to trade the Marine Chain Token as a security.
g. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would tokenize
individual vessels on the Marine Chain platform, allowing investors
to purchase ownership interests in marine shipping vessels.
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C. OVERT ACTS
43. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its
objects, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and PARK JIN HYOK,
together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, on or about
the dates set forth below, committed and caused to be committed
various overt acts, in the Central District of California and
elsewhere, including, but not limited to, the following:
Overt Act Nos. 1–45: The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates
Overt Act Number 1 through Overt Act Number 45 of Section C of Count
One of this Indictment here.
Overt Act No. 46: Beginning no later than October 31, 2017,
defendant KIM IL and other conspirators communicated with each other
regarding development of Marine Chain.
Overt Act No. 47: Beginning on November 28, 2017, while in
Russia, defendant KIM IL communicated with individuals in Singapore
about establishing Marine Chain.
Overt Act No. 48: On May 1, 2018, defendant KIM IL sent a
final business plan for Marine Chain to a conspirator.
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FORFEITURE ALLEGATION ONE
[18 U.S.C. §§ 982 and 1030]
1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, notice is hereby given that the United States will seek
forfeiture as part of any sentence, pursuant to Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 982(a)(2) and 1030(i), in the event of any
defendant’s conviction of the offense set forth in Count One of this
Indictment.
2. Any defendant so convicted shall forfeit to the United
States of America the following:
a. All right, title, and interest in any and all
property, real or personal, constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the
offense;
b. Any property used or intended to be used to commit the
offense; and
c. To the extent such property is not available for
forfeiture, a sum of money equal to the total value of the property
described in subparagraphs (a) and (b).
3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p),
as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(b)(1)
and 1030(i), any defendant so convicted shall forfeit substitute
property, up to the total value of the property described in the
preceding paragraph if, as the result of any act or omission of said
defendant, the property described in the preceding paragraph, or any
portion thereof: (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due
diligence; (b) has been transferred, sold to or deposited with a
third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the
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court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has
been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without
difficulty.
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FORFEITURE ALLEGATION TWO
[18 U.S.C. § 982]
1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, notice is hereby given that the United States of America
will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence, pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 982(a)(2), in the event of any
defendant’s conviction of the offense set forth in Count Two of this
Indictment.
2. Any defendant so convicted shall forfeit to the United
States of America the following:
a. All right, title and interest in any and all property,
real or personal, constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense; and
b. To the extent such property is not available for
forfeiture, a sum of money equal to the total value of the property
described in subparagraph (a).
3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p),
as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b), any
defendant so convicted shall forfeit substitute property, up to the
total value of the property described in the preceding paragraph if,
as the result of any act or omission of said defendant, the property
described in the preceding paragraph, or any portion thereof: (a)
cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been
transferred, sold to or deposited with a third party; (c) has been
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (d) has been
//
//
//
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substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with
other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.
A TRUE BILL
/S/
Foreperson
TRACY L. WILKISON
Attorney for the United States,
Acting Under Authority Conferred
by 28 U.S.C. § 515
CHRISTOPHER D. GRIGG
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, National Security Division
CAMERON L. SCHROEDER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Cyber and Intellectual
Property Crimes Section
ANIL J. ANTONY
Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Cyber and
Intellectual Property Crimes
Section
KHALDOUN SHOBAKI
Assistant United States Attorney
Cyber and Intellectual Property
Crimes Section
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
January 2020 Grand Jury
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JON CHANG HYOK,
aka “Quan Jiang,”
aka “Alex Jiang,”
KIM IL,
aka “Julien Kim,”
aka “Tony Walker,” and
PARK JIN HYOK,
aka “Jin Hyok Park,”
aka “Pak Jin Hek,”
aka “Pak Kwang Jin,”
Defendants.
CR
I N D I C T M E N T
[18 U.S.C. § 371: Conspiracy; 18
U.S.C. § 1349: Conspiracy to
Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud;
18 U.S.C. §§ 982, 1030: Criminal
Forfeiture]
The Grand Jury charges:
INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
At times relevant to this Indictment:
A. The Conspiracy and Defendants
1. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”), also
known as (“aka”) North Korea, operated a military intelligence agency
called the Reconnaissance General Bureau (“RGB”). The RGB was
headquartered in Pyongyang, DPRK, and comprised multiple units.
2:20-cr-00614-DMG
12/8/2020
JB
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2. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK (ࢷ ,(ୂॷaka “Quan Jiang,” aka
“Alex Jiang”; KIM IL (̡ࢊ ,(aka “Julien Kim,” aka “Tony Walker”; and
PARK JIN HYOK (ऑୂ), aka “Jin Hyok Park,” aka “Pak Jin Hek,” aka
“Pak Kwang Jin” (collectively, the “defendants”), whose photographs
are attached as Exhibit A through Exhibit C, respectively, were
members of units of the RGB who knowingly and intentionally conspired
with each other, and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury
(collectively, with the defendants, referred to as the “conspirators”
and the “hackers”), to conduct criminal cyber intrusions.
3. The defendants and other conspirators resided in the DPRK,
but, at times during the operation of the conspiracy, traveled to and
worked from other countries -- including the People’s Republic of
China and the Russian Federation -- while employed by units of the
RGB. The conspirators included members of units of the RGB that have
come to be known within the cyber-security community as both Lazarus
Group and Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (“APT38”).
4. The conspirators hacked into the computers of victims to
cause damage, steal data and money, and otherwise further the
strategic and financial interests of the DPRK government and its
leader, Kim Jong Un (the “DPRK regime”). In some instances, the
hackers sought to cause damage through computer intrusions in
response to perceived reputational harm or to obtain information
furthering strategic interests of the DPRK regime. In many
instances, the hackers intended the computer intrusions to steal
currency and virtual currency (also known as “cryptocurrency”), or to
obtain it through extortion, for the benefit of the DPRK regime --
and, at times, for their own private financial gain. The hackers
attempted to steal or extort more than $1.3 billion from victims in
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cyber-enabled heists and Automated Teller Machine (“ATM”) cash-outs
from banks, cyber-enabled heists from cryptocurrency companies, and
cyber-enabled extortion schemes.
5. The hackers’ victims and intended victims included
entertainment companies, financial institutions, cryptocurrency
companies (including cryptocurrency exchanges, traders, and
marketplaces), online casinos, cleared defense contractors, energy
utilities, and individuals. The hackers hacked and defrauded victims
around the world -- including in Bangladesh, Malta, Mexico,
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea,
Slovenia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Central America, and
Africa -- as well as in the United States and, specifically, the
Central District of California. The hackers targeted victims in
numerous other countries, as well, and used infrastructure and online
accounts from around the world in furtherance of the computer
intrusions, including infrastructure located in the Central District
of California.
6. The computer intrusions often started with fraudulent,
spear-phishing messages -- emails and other electronic communications
designed to make intended victims download and execute malicious
software (“malware”) developed by the hackers. At other times, the
spear-phishing messages would encourage intended victims to download
or invest in a cryptocurrency-related software program created by the
hackers, which covertly contained malicious code and/or would
subsequently be updated with malicious code after the program was
downloaded (a “malicious cryptocurrency application”). To hone the
spear-phishing messages, the hackers would conduct internet research
regarding their intended victims and would send “test” spear-phishing
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messages to each other or themselves. The hackers employed false and
fraudulent personas when they sent spear-phishing messages to
victims.
7. Once they gained access to a victim computer system, the
hackers would conduct research within the system, attempt to move
laterally within a computer network, and attempt to locate and
exfiltrate sensitive and confidential information. In both revengeand financially-motivated computer attacks, the hackers would, at
times, execute commands to destroy computer systems, deploy
ransomware, or otherwise render the computers of their victims
inoperable.
8. The hackers took steps to avoid detection and attribution
of their computer intrusions to themselves, the RGB, and the DPRK.
However, the computer infrastructure and online accounts used in the
computer intrusions, and technical similarities in the malware
employed, connected these computer intrusions with the hackers,
showing that (a) the defendants and other hackers were conspiring
with one another, (b) they were members of the RGB, and (c) the
computer intrusions were part of a single hacking conspiracy.
B. The Hackers’ Targets
Entertainment Companies
9. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. (“Sony Pictures”) was an
American entertainment company, headquartered in Culver City,
California, that produced and distributed filmed entertainment,
including the movie “The Interview,” which depicted the fictionalized
assassination of Kim Jong Un, whom it parodied. Sony Pictures
maintained computer systems, including servers hosting employee data
and servers hosting intellectual property, in Los Angeles County,
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within the Central District of California, that operated in
interstate and foreign commerce.
10. AMC Theatres was an American movie theater chain
headquartered in Leawood, Kansas, which was set to show “The
Interview” in its theaters prior to the cyber-attack on Sony
Pictures.
11. Mammoth Screen was a United Kingdom television production
company that was producing “Opposite Number,” a ten-part fictional
series about a British nuclear scientist on a covert mission who was
taken prisoner in the DPRK.
Financial Institutions and Financial Regulators
12. The “African Bank” was a bank headquartered in a country in
Africa.
13. Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, was
headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
14. Banco Nacional De Comercio Exterior, which is also known as
“Bancomext,” was a Mexican state-owned bank headquartered in Mexico
City, Mexico.
15. The “Maltese Bank” was a bank headquartered in Malta.
16. BankIslami Pakistan Limited, which is also known as
“BankIslami,” was a bank headquartered in Karachi, Pakistan.
17. The “New York Financial Services Company” was a financial
services company headquartered in New York, New York.
18. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority was the
financial regulatory authority for Poland, and was based in Warsaw,
Poland.
19. The “Philippine Bank” was a bank headquartered in Makati,
Philippines.
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20. Far Eastern International Bank was a bank headquartered in
Taipei, Taiwan.
21. The “Vietnamese Bank” was a bank headquartered in Hanoi,
Vietnam.
Cryptocurrency Companies
22. The “Indonesian Cryptocurrency Company” was a
cryptocurrency exchange based in Jakarta, Indonesia.
23. The “South Korean Cryptocurrency Company” was a
cryptocurrency exchange based in the Republic of Korea.
24. The “Slovenian Cryptocurrency Company” was a crypto-mining
company headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Online Casino Companies
25. “Central American Online Casino 1” was an online casino
business headquartered in a Central American country.
26. “Central American Online Casino 2” was an online casino
business headquartered in a Central American country.
C. Definitions
27. An Internet Protocol version 4 address, also known as an
“IPv4 address,” or more commonly an “IP address,” is a set of four
numbers or “octets,” each ranging from 0 to 255 and separated by a
period (“.”) that is used to route traffic on the internet. A single
IP address can manage internet traffic for more than one computer or
device, such as in a workspace or when a router in one’s home routes
traffic to one’s desktop computer, as well as one’s tablet or
smartphone, while all using the same IP address to access the
internet.
28. “Malware” is malicious computer software intended to cause
a victim computer to behave in a manner inconsistent with the
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intention of the owner or user of the victim computer, usually
unbeknownst to that person. The hackers developed and used numerous
types of malware, including worms, ransomware, credential-stealers,
key-loggers, screen-grabbers, and backdoors.
29. “Brambul” is a type of “worm” malware that spreads through
self-replication by infecting new victim systems via brute force
attacks on the victim’s Server Message Block (“SMB”) protocol. SMB
is a method that Microsoft systems use to share files on a network.
A brute force attack is a computer network attack that attempts to
login to a potential victim computer, server, or account using a
predetermined list of possible username and password combinations,
which lists often contain thousands of common combinations of
usernames and passwords that include specific default settings used
on certain applications and devices. Upon successfully gaining
access to a victim computer, Brambul conducts a survey of the victim
machine and collects information, including the victim’s IP address,
system name, operating system, username last logged in, and last
password used. Brambul then sends that information via Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol to one or more of the email addresses (“Brambul
collector accounts”) that are hard-coded in Brambul.
30. “Ransomware” is a type of malware that infects a computer
and encrypts some or all of the data or files on the computer, and
then demands that the victim pay a ransom in order to decrypt and
recover the files, or in order to prevent the hacker from
distributing or destroying the data.
31. A “watering hole” is a type of computer intrusion technique
in which a hacker uses malware to compromise a website known to be
visited by intended victims. The malware then infects the computers
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of intended victims (and sometimes unintended victims) who visit the
website, giving the hacker access to the victims’ computers and
networks.
32. “Command and control” IP addresses or domains -- sometimes
referred to as “C2s” -- are computers with which malware communicates
to send and receive data and commands.
33. A “spear-phishing” message is a tailored and personalized
email or other electronic communication designed to appear legitimate
in order to induce the targeted recipient(s) to take a certain action
-- such as clicking on a link, or downloading or opening a file --
that would cause a victim’s computer to be compromised by a hacker.
Spear-phishing messages often include information that the hacker
knows about the recipient(s) based on research or other sources of
information about the intended victim.
34. “Cryptocurrency” or “virtual currency” is a digital asset
designed to work as a medium of exchange that uses cryptography to
secure financial transactions, control the creation of additional
units of the currency, and verify and transfer assets.
Cryptocurrency is typically accessed using secret or private
encryption “keys” which are commonly stored using a software
“wallet.” Cryptocurrency “exchanges” are clearinghouses that allow
for the exchange between different types of cryptocurrencies, or
between cryptocurrency and fiat currency. “Crypto-mining” is a means
of generating new units of cryptocurrency.
35. An “initial coin offering” or “ICO” is the cryptocurrency
equivalent of a stock’s Initial Public Offering or “IPO” -- that is,
a cryptocurrency developer’s first offer to sell a stake in a
cryptocurrency to the public.
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COUNT ONE
[18 U.S.C. § 371]
36. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1
through 35 of the Introductory Allegations and Definitions of this
Indictment.
A. OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
37. Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later
than September 28, 2009, and continuing through at least December 8,
2020, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of
California, and elsewhere, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and
PARK JIN HYOK, together with others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury, knowingly conspired:
a. to intentionally access computers without
authorization and obtain information from protected computers, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(2)(C),
(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii);
b. to knowingly and with intent to defraud access
protected computers without authorization, and by means of such
conduct further the intended fraud and obtain a thing of value, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(4),
(c)(3)(A);
c. to knowingly cause the transmission of programs,
information, codes, and commands, and as a result of such conduct
intentionally cause damage without authorization to protected
computers, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I),
(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI); and
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d. to transmit in interstate and foreign commerce, with
the intent to extort money and other things of value, a communication
containing (i) a threat to cause damage to a protected computer,
(ii) a threat to impair the confidentiality of information obtained
from a protected computer without authorization, and (iii) a demand
and request for money and other things of value in relation to damage
to a protected computer, where such damage was caused to facilitate
the extortion, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1030(a)(7)(A)–(C), (c)(3)(A).
B. MEANS BY WHICH THE OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY WERE TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED
38. The objects of the conspiracy were to be accomplished, in
substance, as follows:
Development and Dissemination of Malware
a. The hackers would develop malware that could be
transmitted to potential victims in order to gain unauthorized access
to the computer(s) of the victims. Such malware would include the
Brambul worm, ransomware, and other types of malware.
b. At times, the hackers would conceal the malware within
seemingly legitimate word processing documents or software
applications, including programs related to cryptocurrency trading
(i.e., malicious cryptocurrency applications), which the hackers
would falsely and fraudulently, and through the omission of material
facts, market as being legitimate software applications. Malicious
cryptocurrency applications would contain, or would through a
subsequent software update process be updated to contain, malicious
code that would provide the hackers with unauthorized access to the
computers of persons who downloaded the applications.
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c. At other times, the hackers would conceal the malware
within legitimate websites in order to infect victims visiting the
websites (i.e., a watering hole).
d. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, PARK JIN HYOK, and
other conspirators, would register and use email and social media
accounts in false and fraudulent names -- including the names of real
persons -- to use in gaining unauthorized access to victim computers,
including to contact potential victims, send spear-phishing messages,
register other accounts used by the hackers, and/or serve as Brambul
collector accounts.
e. Hackers would use the internet to research potential
victims with whom they would attempt to communicate.
f. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and other
conspirators, would communicate with potential victims using false
and fraudulent names, sending spear-phishing messages or electronic
messages designed to establish a relationship with the intended
victim before sending a later spear-phishing message. The hackers
would communicate with individuals in a variety of sectors, including
entertainment companies, financial institutions, hundreds of
cryptocurrency companies, online casinos, cleared defense
contractors, energy utilities, technology companies, and government
agencies.
g. Defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and other
conspirators, would send misleading and fraudulent communications to
potential victims containing malware or directing the potential
victims to download malware, including malicious cryptocurrency
applications, ransomware, and other malware.
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h. At times, to carry out computer intrusions or
attempted intrusions, hackers would use or access computer
infrastructure that they had compromised through the Brambul worm or
a watering hole.
Destructive Cyberattacks, and Attempted Cyberattacks,
on Entertainment Companies
i. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim entertainment company, the hackers would use the
malware to access the computer(s) without authorization and install
other malware.
j. The hackers would then access the computer(s) of the
victim entertainment company without authorization and attempt to
access other computer systems connected to the computer(s) to steal
confidential credentials, files, data, unreleased movies, and other
information that could be damaging or embarrassing to the
entertainment company.
k. The hackers would then install destructive malware on
the victim entertainment company’s computers, which malware could be
used to destroy or impair the computers and render them inoperable,
and to conceal forensic evidence of the hackers’ unauthorized access.
l. After successfully installing destructive malware on
computers of the victim entertainment company, the hackers would, at
a later date, make threatening communications to the victim
entertainment company using false and fraudulent personas, publicly
disseminate the victim entertainment company’s confidential internal
information, and activate destructive capabilities of the malware the
hackers previously installed in order to destroy or impair the victim
entertainment company’s computers and render them inoperable.
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Bank Cyber-Enabled Heists
m. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim bank, the hackers would use the malware to access the
computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
n. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
bank without authorization and attempt to move through the bank’s
network in order to access one or more computers that the victim bank
used to send or receive messages through the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) communication system.
o. The hackers would develop and deploy malware
customized to the computer network of the victim bank, in order to
send fraudulent SWIFT messages from the victim bank’s computer
system, authorizing fraudulent wire transfers to bank accounts used
and controlled by the hackers, including accounts at United States
federally insured financial institutions.
p. The hackers also would develop and deploy destructive
malware to conceal their point of access to the victim bank’s
computer network, their path through the victim bank’s computer
network, and the fraudulent wire transfers.
q. At times, the hackers would install, on the
computer(s), malware designed to destroy, impair, or render
inoperable the victim bank’s computer network or computers within the
network, and to conceal forensic evidence of the hackers’
unauthorized access to the computer(s).
Cyber-Enabled Extortions
r. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended extortion victim, the hackers would use the malware to
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access the computer(s) without authorization and install other
malware.
s. The hackers would then access the computer(s) of the
extortion victim without authorization and attempt to access other
computer systems connected to the computer(s) to steal confidential
credentials, files, data, and other information that could be
damaging or embarrassing to the extortion victim.
t. At times, the hackers would install ransomware on the
computer(s) of the extortion victim in order to render the
computer(s) inaccessible and inoperable.
u. The hackers would then communicate with the extortion
victim, demanding a payment in a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, in
exchange for not publicly releasing the extortion victim’s files that
had been stolen or unencrypting any computers infected by ransomware.
v. The hackers would, at times, offer to tell the
extortion victim how the hackers had accessed the extortion victim’s
computer(s) if additional ransom payments were made.
w. If the extortion victim did not pay the hackers’
ransom demands, the hackers would threaten to -- and would in fact --
publicly disseminate confidential information stolen from the
computer(s) of the extortion victim, destroy the information and not
return a copy, or leave the computer(s) of the victim encrypted with
ransomware.
Cryptocurrency Heists
x. After malware, such as a malicious cryptocurrency
application, was installed on the computer(s) of an intended victim
cryptocurrency company, the hackers would use the malware to access
the computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
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y. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
cryptocurrency company without authorization and attempt to move
through the victim cryptocurrency company’s computer network in order
to access a computer that would provide access to the victim
cryptocurrency company’s cryptocurrency wallet(s) and private keys to
the wallet.
z. Once they had access to the wallet(s) and private keys
of the victim cryptocurrency company, the hackers would fraudulently
and without authorization transfer cryptocurrency from those wallets
to wallets used and controlled by the hackers.
ATM Cash-Outs
aa. After malware was installed on the computer(s) of an
intended victim bank, the hackers would use the malware to access the
computer(s) without authorization and install other malware.
bb. The hackers would access the computer(s) of the victim
bank without authorization and attempt to move through the victim
bank’s computer network in order to access one or more computers that
the victim bank used to manage ATM transactions.
cc. The hackers would develop and deploy malware
customized to the computer network of the victim bank, in order to
intercept ATM transaction data and cause fraudulent ATM withdrawal
requests to be approved, which would cause a requesting ATM to
dispense cash to money-launderer coconspirators.
dd. The hackers also developed and deployed malware to
conceal their point of access to the victim bank’s computer network,
their path through the victim bank’s computer network, and the
fraudulent ATM withdrawal requests.
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C. OVERT ACTS
39. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its
objects, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and PARK JIN HYOK,
together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, on or about
the dates set forth below, committed and caused to be committed
various overt acts, in the Central District of California and
elsewhere, including, but not limited to, the following:
Destructive Cyberattacks, and Attempted Cyberattacks,
on Entertainment Companies
Overt Act No. 1: Beginning on November 24, 2014, after
sending threatening communications to Sony Pictures employees, the
hackers initiated a destructive cyber-attack of Sony Pictures
computers, publicly disseminated Sony Pictures’ confidential data and
communications stolen from its computers, and made further threats
against the company and its employees.
Overt Act No. 2: On December 2 and 3, 2014, the hackers sent
spear-phishing messages to AMC Theatres employees from multiple email
accounts.
Overt Act No. 3: At an unknown date in 2015, the hackers
gained unauthorized access to the computers of Mammoth Screen.
Cyber-Enabled Heists from, and Intrusions of, Banks
Overt Act No. 4: Beginning in or around November 2015, the
hackers gained unauthorized access to the Philippine Bank’s computer
network, but did not succeed in making fraudulent wire transfers
before the unauthorized access was detected and mitigated.
Overt Act No. 5: On December 9, 2015, having gained
unauthorized access to the Vietnamese Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire
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transfers totaling approximately €2 million to bank accounts in
Slovenia and Bulgaria, and attempted to conduct fraudulent wire
transfers of approximately $3.4 million to Russia, A$1 million to
Australia, and g90 million to Japan.
Overt Act No. 6: On February 4, 2016, having gained
unauthorized access to Bangladesh Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers attempted to conduct false and fraudulent
wire transfers totaling approximately $951 million, and conducted
false and fraudulent wire transfers totaling approximately
$81 million to bank accounts in the Philippines and $20 million to a
bank account in Sri Lanka, which moneys all belonged to Bangladesh
Bank and were held in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
Overt Act No. 7: On July 20, 2016, having gained unauthorized
access to the African Bank’s computer network at an earlier date, the
hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire transfers totaling
approximately $104.1 million to bank accounts in Taiwan, Thailand,
and Cambodia.
Overt Act No. 8: Beginning in or around October 2016, the
hackers gained unauthorized access to the computer network of the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority and made its website into a
watering hole.
Overt Act No. 9: On October 3, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to Far Eastern International Bank’s computer
network at an earlier date, the hackers conducted false and
fraudulent wire transfers totaling approximately $60.1 million to
bank accounts in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and the United States.
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Overt Act No. 10: On January 9, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to Bancomext’s computer network at an earlier
date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire transfers
totaling approximately $110 million to bank accounts in the Republic
of Korea, and then deployed malware on more than 400 of Bancomext’s
computers.
Overt Act No. 11: In January and February 2019, defendant KIM
IL or another hacker communicated with unindicted coconspirator
Ghaleb Alaumary regarding bank accounts that could receive false and
fraudulent wire transfers from the Maltese Bank.
Overt Act No. 12: On February 12, 2019, having gained
unauthorized access to the Maltese Bank’s computer network at an
earlier date, the hackers conducted false and fraudulent wire
transfers totaling approximately $6.4 million and €7.1 million to
bank accounts in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the Czech Republic.
Cyber-Enabled Extortions and Ransomware
Overt Act No. 13: On or before May 12, 2017, the hackers
authored the ransomware used in a global, destructive cyber-attack
known publicly as WannaCry Version 2.
Overt Act No. 14: On June 29, 2017, having gained unauthorized
access to a computer system at an earlier date and stolen
confidential customer information of the South Korean Cryptocurrency
Company, the hackers publicly released that information after the
South Korean Cryptocurrency Company refused to pay a ransom of
approximately $16 million in cryptocurrency.
Overt Act No. 15: On August 24, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to a computer system of a victim company at an
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earlier date, the hackers deployed ransomware on the computer system
and then extorted payments totaling approximately $100,000 in
cryptocurrency from the victim.
Overt Act No. 16: On October 13, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of Central American
Online Casino 1 at an earlier date and stolen its confidential
customer information, the hackers extorted payments totaling
approximately $2.3 million in cryptocurrency from Central American
Online Casino 1.
Overt Act No. 17: On November 2, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of Central American
Online Casino 2 at an earlier date and stolen its confidential
customer information, the hackers extorted payments totaling
approximately $361,500 in cryptocurrency from Central American Online
Casino 2.
Malicious Cryptocurrency Applications
Overt Act No. 18: Beginning in March 2018, defendant JON CHANG
HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications, including
spear-phishing messages, to numerous employees of cryptocurrency
exchanges.
Overt Act No. 19: Beginning on or before May 15, 2018,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Celas Trade Pro,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 20: Beginning on June 18, 2018, defendant JON
CHANG HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications
advertising Celas Trade Pro to numerous employees of cryptocurrency
exchanges.
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Overt Act No. 21: Beginning on or before October 11, 2018,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed WorldBit-Bot,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 22: Beginning on November 14, 2018, defendant
JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers sent electronic communications
advertising WorldBit-Bot to employees of cryptocurrency exchanges.
Overt Act No. 23: Beginning on or before March 6, 2019, the
hackers developed iCryptoFx, which was purportedly a “Cryptocurrency
Algo-Trading Tool,” but which was, in reality, a malicious
cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 24: Beginning on April 27, 2019, defendant KIM
IL or another hacker created online accounts using false and
fraudulent personas for purported employees of iCryptoFx, which were
designed to make iCryptoFx appear to be a legitimate cryptocurrency
program.
Overt Act No. 25: Beginning on or before June 4, 2019,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Union Crypto
Trader, which was purportedly a cryptocurrency trading software, but
which was, in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 26: On dates in April 2019 through July 2019,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers created online accounts
using false and fraudulent personas for purported employees of Union
Crypto Trader, which were designed to make Union Crypto Trader appear
to be legitimate.
Overt Act No. 27: Beginning on or before February 21, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Kupay Wallet,
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which was purportedly cryptocurrency wallet software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 28: Beginning on or before February 28, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed CoinGo Trade,
which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was,
in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 29: In early March 2020, defendant JON CHANG
HYOK or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of Kupay Wallet.
Overt Act No. 30: In late March 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of CoinGo Trade.
Overt Act No. 31: Beginning on or before March 30, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed Dorusio, which
was purportedly cryptocurrency wallet software, but which was, in
reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 32: On March 30, 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of Dorusio.
Overt Act No. 33: Beginning on or before May 6, 2020,
defendant JON CHANG HYOK and other hackers developed CryptoNeuro
Trader, which was purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but
which was, in reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Overt Act No. 34: In late July 2020, defendant JON CHANG HYOK
or another hacker sent electronic communications advertising and
encouraging the download of CryptoNeuro Trader.
Overt Act No. 35: Beginning on or before September 1, 2020, a
conspirator or conspirators developed Ants2Whale, which was
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purportedly cryptocurrency trading software, but which was, in
reality, a malicious cryptocurrency application.
Cryptocurrency Heists
Overt Act No. 36: On December 4, 2017, a conspirator sent a
spear-phishing communication to an employee of the Slovenian
Cryptocurrency Company, which included a hyperlink that redirected
the employee to download a file containing malware.
Overt Act No. 37: On December 15, 2017, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the Slovenian
Cryptocurrency Company at an earlier date, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $75 million, from
the wallets of the Slovenian Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 38: In March 2018 and April 2018, a conspirator
sent spear-phishing communications to employees of the Indonesian
Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 39: On September 27, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the Indonesian
Cryptocurrency Company at an earlier date, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $24.9 million,
from the wallets of the Indonesian Cryptocurrency Company.
Overt Act No. 40: On August 7, 2020, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of the New York Financial
Services Company at an earlier date by using the CryptoNeuro Trader
malicious cryptocurrency application, and using that unauthorized
access to steal data that they would later use to attempt to extort
the New York Financial Services Company, the hackers fraudulently
transferred cryptocurrency, valued at approximately $11.8 million,
from the wallets of the New York Financial Services Company.
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ATM Cash-Outs
Overt Act No. 41: On October 27, 2018, having gained
unauthorized access to the computer network of BankIslami, the
hackers caused fraudulent ATM withdrawal requests to be approved,
which caused requesting ATMs to dispense approximately $6.1 million
to money-launderer coconspirators, including coconspirators acting at
the direction of unindicted coconspirator Ghaleb Alaumary.
Additional Spear-Phishing Campaigns
Overt Act No. 42: Beginning in March 2016 and continuing
through August 2016, conspirators sent numerous spear-phishing
communications to employees of United States cleared defense
contractors, energy companies, and aerospace companies.
Overt Act No. 43: Beginning in February 2017 and continuing
through May 2017, conspirators sent numerous spear-phishing
communications to United States cleared defense contractors.
Overt Act No. 44: In November 2019, conspirators sent spearphishing communications to the employees of the United States
Department of State.
Overt Act No. 45: In January and February 2020, conspirators
sent numerous spear-phishing communications to employees of the
United States Department of State, the United States Department of
Defense, and multiple United States technology companies.
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COUNT TWO
[18 U.S.C. § 1349]
40. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1
through 35 of the Introductory Allegations and Definitions of this
Indictment.
A. OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
41. Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later
than September 28, 2009, and continuing through at least December 8,
2020, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of
California, and elsewhere, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and
PARK JIN HYOK, together with others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury, knowingly conspired to commit the following offenses:
a. wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1343; and
b. bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1344(2).
B. THE MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
42. The objects of the conspiracy were to be accomplished, in
substance, as follows:
a. The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs
38.a through 38.dd of Section B of Count One of this Indictment.
Marine Chain
b. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would develop
a plan to create a digital token called “Marine Chain Token,” which
would allow investors to purchase fractional ownership interests in
marine shipping vessels, such as cargo ships, supported by a
blockchain.
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c. Defendant KIM IL would contact individuals in
Singapore, whom defendant KIM IL knew from when he previously lived
in Singapore, regarding potential involvement in creating Marine
Chain.
d. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would, at
other times, use false and fraudulent names when contacting
individuals who they hoped would be involved in creating Marine
Chain. In those instances, defendant KIM IL and other conspirators
would not disclose to these individuals that the conspirators were
DPRK citizens or that they were communicating using false and
fraudulent names.
e. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would raise
funds for the Marine Chain platform through an ICO, which would, in
part, entail communicating with potential investors using false and
fraudulent names in order to convince them to invest in the Marine
Chain platform. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would not
disclose to these individuals that the conspirators were DPRK
citizens or that they were communicating using false and fraudulent
names. They also would not disclose to investors that a purpose of
the Marine Chain Token was to evade United States sanctions on North
Korea.
f. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would attempt
to receive approval from the Securities and Futures Commission of
Hong Kong to trade the Marine Chain Token as a security.
g. Defendant KIM IL and other conspirators would tokenize
individual vessels on the Marine Chain platform, allowing investors
to purchase ownership interests in marine shipping vessels.
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C. OVERT ACTS
43. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its
objects, defendants JON CHANG HYOK, KIM IL, and PARK JIN HYOK,
together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, on or about
the dates set forth below, committed and caused to be committed
various overt acts, in the Central District of California and
elsewhere, including, but not limited to, the following:
Overt Act Nos. 1–45: The Grand Jury re-alleges and incorporates
Overt Act Number 1 through Overt Act Number 45 of Section C of Count
One of this Indictment here.
Overt Act No. 46: Beginning no later than October 31, 2017,
defendant KIM IL and other conspirators communicated with each other
regarding development of Marine Chain.
Overt Act No. 47: Beginning on November 28, 2017, while in
Russia, defendant KIM IL communicated with individuals in Singapore
about establishing Marine Chain.
Overt Act No. 48: On May 1, 2018, defendant KIM IL sent a
final business plan for Marine Chain to a conspirator.
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FORFEITURE ALLEGATION ONE
[18 U.S.C. §§ 982 and 1030]
1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, notice is hereby given that the United States will seek
forfeiture as part of any sentence, pursuant to Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 982(a)(2) and 1030(i), in the event of any
defendant’s conviction of the offense set forth in Count One of this
Indictment.
2. Any defendant so convicted shall forfeit to the United
States of America the following:
a. All right, title, and interest in any and all
property, real or personal, constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the
offense;
b. Any property used or intended to be used to commit the
offense; and
c. To the extent such property is not available for
forfeiture, a sum of money equal to the total value of the property
described in subparagraphs (a) and (b).
3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p),
as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(b)(1)
and 1030(i), any defendant so convicted shall forfeit substitute
property, up to the total value of the property described in the
preceding paragraph if, as the result of any act or omission of said
defendant, the property described in the preceding paragraph, or any
portion thereof: (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due
diligence; (b) has been transferred, sold to or deposited with a
third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the
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court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has
been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without
difficulty.
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FORFEITURE ALLEGATION TWO
[18 U.S.C. § 982]
1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, notice is hereby given that the United States of America
will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence, pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 982(a)(2), in the event of any
defendant’s conviction of the offense set forth in Count Two of this
Indictment.
2. Any defendant so convicted shall forfeit to the United
States of America the following:
a. All right, title and interest in any and all property,
real or personal, constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense; and
b. To the extent such property is not available for
forfeiture, a sum of money equal to the total value of the property
described in subparagraph (a).
3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p),
as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b), any
defendant so convicted shall forfeit substitute property, up to the
total value of the property described in the preceding paragraph if,
as the result of any act or omission of said defendant, the property
described in the preceding paragraph, or any portion thereof: (a)
cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been
transferred, sold to or deposited with a third party; (c) has been
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (d) has been
//
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substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with
other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.
A TRUE BILL
/S/
Foreperson
TRACY L. WILKISON
Attorney for the United States,
Acting Under Authority Conferred
by 28 U.S.C. § 515
CHRISTOPHER D. GRIGG
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, National Security Division
CAMERON L. SCHROEDER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Cyber and Intellectual
Property Crimes Section
ANIL J. ANTONY
Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Cyber and
Intellectual Property Crimes
Section
KHALDOUN SHOBAKI
Assistant United States Attorney
Cyber and Intellectual Property
Crimes Section
